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Directed by: Professor Karl Ryavec
In this dissertation the author assesses the
possibility of using U.S. economic sanctions as a
political lever in relations with the Soviet Union. The
case under study is the U.S. sanctions against the
Soviet Union in January 1980 - April 1981, after the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
The author comes to the conclusion that the American
ability to affect Soviet behavior by export controls
appears to be very limited. The economic effect of the
sanctions on both countries was insignificant because of
a very low level of mutual dependency. In such an
attempt the USA was not backed up by its allies for a
long time and short-term sanctions could be successful
only if undertaken together with the allies. That is why
the Soviet Union did not make concessions. Politically
the sanctions hurt the United States more than the Soviet
Union (relations with the allies, controversy in the USA,
etc . )
.
iv
The Western ability to change Soviet domestic policyby using economic pressure is extremely lifted too.Usual Soviet response to external pressure is to tighten
up domestically rather than to try reforms. Reforms candraw the country into an unravelling process which could
be too dangerous politically for the Soviet elite
Reforms in the USSR can come about as a result of a
domestic crisis rather than pressure from abroad. But
economic cooperation with the Soviets only helps to avoid
or put off such a crisis.
The Soviet Union is not vulnerable in the sense that
it is almost self-sufficient economically and can survive
without Western help. Western economic sanctions can
have a negative but still an insignificant effect on its
economy. The West cannot think about the USSR in terms
of an imminent collapse. Therefore economic sanctions
aimed at "improvement" of Soviet behavior are likely to
fail
.
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INTRODUCTION.
The struggle for power in
.odern international
relations is undergoing two major changes: first, the
elements of national power (military might, population,
territory, natural resources, economy, technological
level, etc.) are changing and shifting their relative
positions on the scale of importance. Because of the
danger of elimination of mankind as a likely result of a
nuclear world war the role of military force is
decreasing. Unlike in the 19th and the first half of the
20th century, now it can hardly be used directly between
major world powers. Military force is acquiring a new
role
- as deterrence and threat of force rather than use.
However, "unthinkable" the direct use of military might
now is it does not mean that the struggle for power in
international relations has ended. Rather, the struggle
is shifting into other areas - economics and the
technological race, intelligence, limited wars, and
propaganda as a struggle for human minds.
The second major change in modern international
relations is the increasing economic, environmental, and
other interdependence which reduces the zero-sum option
and makes actions of one superpower against the other a
two edged weapon that can hurt both the adversary and the
originator of the actions.
Under these circumstances the use of the economic
weapon for political purposes is increasing and in view
of the increasing in terdependency is becoming more
intricate. This might or might not mean it is impossible
1
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«"* -OholT.s u d develop an elaborated theory of its use which isbased on practical experience of recent decades.
The major task of this work is to assess thepcssibility of using US economic sanctions as a politicallever in relations with the Soviet Union. The case under
study is the US sanctions against the Soviet Union inJanuary 1980
- April 1981. after the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan. This may be a part of a more general task
to analyze experience of the use of economics for
political purposes in international relations accumulated
in recent decades
- the US Afghanistan sanctions, the
Siberian gas pipeline sanctions and sanctions against
Poland after imposition of the martial law, the Arab oil
embargoes of the 1970s, the use of trade and economic aid
for political purposes by the USSR, and other examples.
The analysis and sy s tematiza tion of all these experiences
can help to create a general theory of using economics as
a weapon in modern international relations.
Another task of this work is to analyze American and
Soviet behavior in a crisis situation. The case of the
Afghan intervention appears to be exceptional for a
number of reasons. The USSR used its own military forces
there instead of acting, as it usually does, through its
proxies. Specific crisis circumstances made the Kremlin
use force that way. The USSR was also acting militarily
outside its recognized sphere of dominance. The Afghan
crisis coincided with the crisis in Poland and Iran where
the Soviet Union did not intervene. The juxtaposition of
the Soviet actions in all these cases allows us to make
certain conclusions regarding the Soviet pattern of
behavior in a crisis situation.
The significance and perhaps even urgency of suchresearch is not in doubt. Economics and technology arethe spheres where the West is still superior while in
certain aspects of military force and in intelligence itis inferior to the Communist bloc. That is why the Westhas been resorting to economic sanctions in relations
»!th the Soviets and why the Kremlin tries to discourage
the West from doing so and thus to limit the struggle
only to intelligence and ideology (at the same time
thoroughly keeping its own population away from Western
ideas' reach). If the USA abandons the economic tool in
relations with the Soviet Union it will have little else
(except a direct war) to respond to further Soviet
expansionism
.
The analysis of Soviet behavior in a crisis
situation has been rather neglected. In contrast to the
rich accumulation of US foreign policy case studies the
Soviet foreign policy case study literature is small,
fragmented, and generally underdeveloped. The Soviet
Union has figured prominently in most American foreign
policy decision-making case studies. However, Soviet
behavior has been treated in such studies not as an
object of inquiry per se, but as an input to the US
decision-making
.
[ 1
]
£lan Q.L the Mojik
The following structure seems to be the most
appropriate. The first chapter deals with the major
sources and literature on the problem. This contains an
analysis of the literature on the use of economic
sanctions in general including the US sanctions against Cuba, the UN
sanctions against Rhodesia, the Arab oil embargo, etc.
The second and the third chapters examine conditions which the
USA has to confront when trying to apply economic sanctions against
the Sovret Union. These are the questions of Soviet self-sufficiency
and vulnerability, Soviet interest in developing economic relations
goals, foreign trade policy, American interest and economic policy
toward the USSR and relations with US allies. The fourth chapter is
a case study of American economic sanctions in response to the Soviet
aggression in Afghanistan, an analysis of American and Soviet behaviorm the crisis situation and the effect of the sanctions.
FOOTNOTES. INTRODUCTION.
[1] Hannes Adomeit, Soviet Ri^k-Taking and Crisis Behavior
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), p. 4.
CHAPTER I
SOURCES
, LITERATURE.
DEBATE ON THE USE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
This work relies heavily on new research as well as
numerous statistical sources, US government and
Congressional documents, and the Soviet and American
press. Primary Soviet sources in Russian are
predominant. The bibliography can be divided into four
major types of sources: statistics, US Congressional and
government documents, official Soviet materials (other
than statistics), and secondary works.
The primary statistical sources are the Soviet
statistical collections "Vneshnjaja Torgovlja SSSR»[1]
and "Narodnoje Khozjaistvo SSSR»[2] for 1970-1982, though
additional years may be used. The annual collections
contain ample material on Soviet foreign trade and
economic performance, though there are some pitfalls.
They are not complete. There is no data on many items,
including important ones such as fuel exports in real
volume since 1976, let alone data on arms exports and the
precious metals trade. The statistical data often is
given only in rubles which does not reflect the slowdown
of growth rates in real volumes because of inflation. [3]
Soviet index numbers tend to inflate the levels of output
and the growth they are designed to measure. [4] Some
important figures on units of output are omitted. For
example, there are no official data on the grain harvests
of 1981 and later.
6
A.Klinghoffer writes that in 1972 the Soviet Union sold
oil and oil products to the USA worth $7.5 mi ll lon
, andm 1973, i.e. during the Arab oil embargo, worth $76 2
million. But unwilling to worsen its relations with theArabs, the Soviet Union did not publicize the sales and
even failed to include them in its statistical
yearbooks
. [ 5
]
According to the CIA, the Soviet Union reports grain
production on a "bunker-weight" basis, that is, as the
grain comes from the combine before preliminary cleaning
and drying is done and before handling and transportation
losses occur. Bunker weight includes excess moisture,
trash, dirt, weed seeds, etc. Measuring Soviet grain
production, the CIA applies an 1U rate for waste and
losses. [6] The Soviet Union curtailed or altered its
release of mineral production data in 1976, and has not
published useful data on most key minerals since. [7]
Estimating reliability of Soviet official
statistics, a staff study prepared for the Joint Economic
Committee, US Congress, wrote in 1978 that the statistics
are often incomplete or misleading and it may not be
possible to verify facts because of the closed nature of
Soviet society. [8]
But still, one can derive sufficient information for
our purpose here. Besides, Soviet statistics can be
added to by Western collections (see "Bibliography.
Statistics.") A lot of statistical data may be found in
other sources of information: US government materials,
publications of the US Congress, including Congressional
Record, Joint Economic Committee publications, the press,
8etc
.
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These contain not only statistical information but
-present different points of view, analysis, forecasts.The Congressional Record and publications of the Joint
Economic Committee are primary sources of information.
The CIA and DIA information and forecasts are also
important. The Departments of State, Defense,
Agriculture issue documents on the matter too (see
"Bibliography. US Congress and Government Documents").
SQV i ftI flf f ir.ifll Materi al s .
Analysis of Soviet five-year-plans (hereinafter -
FYP) of the last decade and the latest, 11th FYP, can
lead one to interesting findings. The Soviets also
publish one-year plans with some (but not full) data on
every previous year. Time and again leaders of the
Soviet Union spoke up on Afghan events and economic
matters. These speeches or articles can be found in the
Soviet press (Znaatila, Iz vesti a, EcnnnnHnh»«i,a ja gai£_La,
Soc ial i s
t
l^h-e^kil Imd, etc.) or periodical literature
: f la novop kh iz ja i stvn
, ME i MQ, Mezh ri nnamrina j a zhlznl.,
etc.). Some are published in collections of speeches
(see "Bibliography. Soviet official materials").
Decisions of Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee are
spelled out in Soviet press which can add information on
the matter too.
Seconds ry MonLs.
This is the most ample source of information. There
Z oI a tnL T ok\ on the Soviet aggression in Af *h—and n he Soviet economy (see "Rihn™uu
^ bibliography. Books").Much ^formation can he found in the periodicalliterature: Hi^, £nr£i£n A£mr£( ^
J^ir^m E^^i^i, ££ £ll££6x> Qil ^ ^
Kussian mentioned above.
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Economic sanctions have been used as an instrument
of foreign policy during the whole history of
international relations and their use has been increased
since World War II. Although economic pressure is
traditionally considered as an important instrument of
foreign policy, its effectiveness has been subject to
question. A review of the literature in this area shows
that the majority of scholars who study the problem
conclude that sanctions are rarely effective and that
they often act as symbolic measures more than workable
tools of foreign policy.
There are two approaches to the study of economic
sanctions. One asserts that sanctions usually provoke
psychological mobilization of the target nation (Galtung,
Nincic, Wallensteen, Doxey). As a result, the economy is
transformed to meet the challenges of sanctions. The
10
second approach focuses on the economic completeness of
sanctions, possi bil i t i es for the target to evade then,(Green, Deese, Knorr) and it aiso comes to the same
conclusion that the sanctions cannot be complete and
usually fail.
Johan Galtung [ 9 ] tries to work out a theory of
economic sanctions. m his classification of the
sanctions he considers them in a broad sense: negative
(punishment), positive (reward); unilateral,
multilateral, universal; general or selective. The
economic sanctions aimed at a rupture of trade relations
he calls economic boycott.
J.Galtung describes "the ideal case for an economic
boycott": Dimports have a very high loading on
important sectors of the target; 2)there is no internal
substitute for the imports; 3)a high proportion of the
imports comes from the sending nation; 4)there is no
external substitute for the imports; 5)the embargoed
goods represent a very small part of the sender's exports
or the goods can be exported to other states; 6)the
target cannot find other markets (in the case when
exports of the target are banned); 7)the goods received
from the target can be easily obtained from other
sources; 8)trade relations are easily supervised and
controlled. These conditions apparently can be met in
relations between a small economic satellite and a major
economic power. The Soviet Union is by far invulnerable
in this sense. J.Galtung states that effectiveness of
economic sanctions is generally low. The target society
may even be partially strengthened because of the hidden
forces that become activated when sanctions are
11
imposed .[10]
Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen [11]
distinguish economic coercion (economic sanctions) from
economic warfare. The former is defined as the
imposition of economic pain by one government on anotherm order to attain some political goal. It is supposed
to influence the policies of the target. The latter has
a military objective, to weaken the target's capacity to
wage war. The bombing of an enemy's industrial
installation could be a valid example but, in most cases,
economic warfare would involve purely economic actions
directed to a military objective.
On the whole, the authors consider the effectiveness
of economic sanctions rather doubtful. But at the same
time they say that there is less reason to dismiss the
utility of sanctions if deterrence is their goal than if
their aim is to alter current policies of the target. [12]
Economic pressure in some cases can contribute to
governmental instability of the target (example of Chile
of the early 1970s). But in other cases it can produce
the opposite effect in a nation where cleavages run less
deep (examples of increasing domestic popularity of
Sadat, Tito, and Castro).
Sanctions may also aim at "domestic consumption":
for example, according to the authors, the principle
objective of the Carter Administration's retaliation
against the Soviet Union was to demonstrate to the
American public that the aggression in Afghanistan would
not be met by passive acquiescence. Similarly, the
support of many governments for the economic boycott of
12
Ian Pith's Rhodesia was meant for domestic consumption
within the initiator nations. [13]
Jerrold Green [14] concentrates his attention on thequestion why econo.ic sanctions fail. He finds two major
reasons: 1)the nature of the international economic
system inherently allows for evasion since alternative
trading partners can always be found, and 2)the sanctions
promote domestic cohesion and adaptation. [ 1 5]
J.Green comes to this conclusion after analyzing
three cases: Cuba (US sanctions), Israel (the Arab
boycott), and Rhodesia (UN sanctions). In all three
cases the costs of complying to the targets outweighed
the risk of attempting to endure economic sanctions.
Compliance in each case would have necessitated a virtual
dismantlement of the target's political, social, and
ideological systems. Thus, elites in each case had only
one realistic option, resistance.
The sanctions failed because each of the targets
found a "significant evader", the Soviet Union for Cuba,
the United States for Israel, and South Africa for
Rhodesi a . [ 1 6]
Peter Wallensteen [17] thinks that the success of
economic sanctions depends on two conditions: 1)the
target must be fairly weak at the outset, and 2)the
target must be politically isolated. Thus, "weak and
politically isolated regimes will, in general, be most
vulnerable to economic pressure". This suggests that the
internal political situation of the target is what
matters mo st . [ 1 8
]
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David Deese [1 9 ] considers economic sanctions from
another, rather unusual angle. He says that much of thelisting literature on the sanctions makes two dubious
actions: Dit is assumed that the initiating nation
aims its action primarily at the target nation; 2)most
sanctions are said to be intended to change the target's
Policy. Yet the objective can be simply to avoid what
might be interpreted as a reward soon after a specific
action of the target took place.
Klaus Knorr [20] also divides economic sanctions
into positive (reward) and negative (withdrawal of the
reward). According to Knorr, there is the influence of
country A, based on A's promise of some sort of goal
gratification to country fi on condition that £ will
supply something of value to A. Although reward power is
considered noncoercive in many cases, it can be shown
that in some cases, positive sanctions are used along
with negative ones, which are the second part of the
overall definition of sanctions. A is threatening E,
but, realizing that it is more likely to get its way by
reducing £'s costs of compliance, A offers a reward. If
the offer and the acceptance of the reward do not occur
only once or seldom, but rather frequently or regularly,
the recipient may become dependent on the reward, and the
rewarding actor is setting up, or at any rate is
presented with, a base for subsequent coercion. He can
threaten to cut off the reward. And, in some cases, the
promised reward can be the suspension of punishment.
These all assume that the country A has enough of a
monopolistic control over the international economic
scene, or at least over country £, that A can
successfully apply these negative sanctions to fi andindeed, to apply the positive sanctions as well.
Does K.Knorr feel that sanctions of any form truly
work? To answer this question, he bases his analysis on
a detailed study of twenty two cases of economic
sanctions, most of which occurred since World War II and
which, since then, have been the only ones causing
considerable diplomatic attention and activity. The
cases have two properties in common: first, they saw theimposition, or the threat, of export or import
restrictions, partial or complete; and, second, the
economic reprisals took place under considerable
publicity and public attention. The cases differ,
however, regarding the specific objectives of the
sanction-imposing governments. The identification of the
objectives is important, because the effectiveness of the
reprisals can obviously be assessed only in terms of
whether or not, or the degree to which, the objective was
achieved. The functional purpose of economic measures
employed as power plays is either to threaten or execute
economic punishment in order to coerce, or to weaken
without coercive intent. The Soviet Union has preferred
however implicit threats in its economic power plays.
Not rarely the unstated purpose of imposing punitive
measures is to deter third states from following the
punished country. Whatever other purposes may have been
involved in the examined cases it is assumed that
coercion was the major intention.
15
K.Knorr then asserts that of the twenty two cases
teTlZ ° f EanCtl0n£ EUCCeeded <«,.Uni d States vs. Britain in 1811, Britain vs. the
95
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95 no t e Arah states vs. Western Europe and Ja pan
n 1973). Three resulted in a compromise settlement, andtwo had an ambiguous outcome. The attempt to wield thistype of national economic power clearly failed inthirteen instances.
The reason that the use of negative economic
sanctions is apt to fail in the large majority of theinstances is that usually the state applying trade
restrictions rarely has sufficient market power to
prevail, that is, a sufficiently strong monopolist
position, to prevent the target state from switching to
any number of other countries for economic supplies and
support. The four cases in which sanctions succeeded
support this conclusion because in each case the imposing
state did in fact have a monopolistic control over its
exports. But only rarely does this happen. Therefore,
K.Knorr concludes, coercively wielding economic power by
means of trade reprisals is rarely successful.
Margaret Doxey [21] also examines a number of
economic sanctions: the Arab boycotts and embargoes,
Soviet and East European boycotts, OAS sanctions against
Dominican Republic and Cuba in the 1960s, UN sanctions
against South Africa and Rhodesia, etc. M. Doxey
concentrates on problems of international enforcement and
reaction to sanctions of a target state.
16
Though she holds that economic sanctions are usuallyineffective means to try to change a target's policy herconclusion is rather intricate. For example, accordingto her, sanctions against Rhodesia proved to beineffective but at the same time she noticed that "it is
clear that sanctions has a direct and generally adverseimpact on the Rhodesian economic life". [22] The Arab oil
embargo of 1973 comb i ned „i th t he ensui ng cl imb in oil
prices, significantly affected foreign and domestic
policies of consumer countries.
The sanctions against Cuba followed Cuban
expropriation without compensation of American property
valued by the US Department of Commerce at $1 billion and
the imposition of discriminatory taxes and licenses on
American products. The US objectives of the sanctions
against Cuba formulated by the Under Secretary of State
George Ball were Dto reduce the will and ability of
Castro's regime to export subversion and violence; 2)to
make plain to the Cubans that the present regime cannot
serve their interests; 3)to demonstrate to the people of
the American Republics that Communism has no future in
the Western Hemisphere; and M)to increase the cost (to
the Soviet Union) of maintaining a Communist outpost in
the Western Hemisphere. M.Doxey insists that the success
of the US policy in terms of first three objectives was
open to question, but there could be no denying the heavy
cost to the Soviet Union which the embargo on Cuba had
represented
. [23]
17
Analyzing a target's reactions to sanctions in theRhodes^an case, M.Doxey pointed to the fact that the UN
sanctions gave a strong impetus to import substitution
and the future development of manufacturing industry ofRhodesia.
Almost an opposite point of view is presented by
M.S.Daoudi and M.S.Dajani. The authors hold that
economic sanctions are effective and useful even if we
do not explore all their complex potentials"
. [24]
Ironically, this conclusion was based on examination of a
great variety of examples (including the US sanctions
against the USSR) which brought other scholars to an
opposite conclusion. Characterizing the impact of the UN
sanctions on Rhodesia (one of the mostly cited example of
failed sanctions) the authors emphasize that there was
never any serious effort to make sanctions work. Most of
the countries that voted for the sanctions did not bother
to implement them and declined to join in efforts to make
them more effective. Nevertheless, even these partial
sanctions affected the Rhodesian economy (for example,
the tobacco industry) and along with other factors, led
to the end of the Smith regime. [25]
As for the sanctions against the Soviet Union, the
latter was able to circumvent the US embargo by buying
grain from Canada and Argentina, but it did so only by
paying much higher prices and accepting serious shipping
del ay s
.
Here we come to the question of a criterion of
successful sanctions. Are they successful only when they
force the target to change its policy or cause its
18
economic collapse? If not
,
uhat elsg can ^ ^
criterion and how can we estimate the contribution of the
economic sanctions to only a P a r ti al deterioration of thetarget's economy? or to only partial change of itspol icy
?
We can single out a group of scholars who
concentrate on examination of economic sanctions against
the Soviet Union ( Adl e r-Ka rl son
,
Becker, Mastanduno).
The Soviet economy is different by being a non-market
one
.
In the majority of works scholars indicated that
economic sanctions promote import substitution and future
development of the production of the embargoed good by
the target. But this can be said about a free market
economy where demand either can be met by import or, when
the imported goods are embargoed, can cause an increase
of domestic supply. This is a typical reaction of a
market economy. In a non-market economy like the Soviet
this mechanism may not work since supply is determined
not by the demand but by political decisions. Imports in
a centralized economy are also a result of political
decisions based on calculation that it is cheaper to
import than to produce by oneself. The usual problem of
a market society is "how to sell", while the problem of a
non-market society is "how to buy". That is why a denial
of foreign goods to a market society can be even
beneficial, first, stimulating local production and,
second, protecting it from foreign competition. At the
same time a denial of foreign goods to a centralized
non-market society can cause increase of cost of
production and therefore slowing down its economic
19
growth
.
This last point about slowing down the economicgrowth is rather important when we try to estimate the
effectiveness of economic sanctions. In the common view
they are considered effective in two cases: Dthey force
the target to change its policy and 2)they cause an
economic collapse of the target country. These goals
cannot be achieved when sanctions are imposed on the
Soviet Union. But does it necessarily mean that they
failed? We can talk about a slow economic growth rather
than economic collapse. At the same time, it is almost
impossible to estimate how much the growth was slowed
down. That is why even a successful economic sanctions
against the Soviet Union (in terms of slowing down its
economic growth) can be declared a failure just because
they did not force it to change its policy.
Gunnar Adle r-Ka rl s son [26] discusses the Western
economic embargo policy against the Communist part of the
world. Defining "embargo" as "a prohibition imposed by
law upon commerce either in general or in one or more of
its branches", Adle r-Ka rl s son analyzes all the
politically motivated restrictions placed upon East-West
trade in the period after 1947. He discusses the history
of this policy which originated in the United States
after World War II and which was reluctantly accepted by
the West European governments, as well as the political
forces which created the policy, and the economic effects
which it may have had on East-West trade and on the
balance of power between the Communist bloc and its
Western adversaries.
20
The essence of the policy, writes Adl e r-Ka rl s son isthat the Western nations have created a jointinstitutional framework by which they try to stop or
control the export of "strategic" goods to the Communist
nations. The key phraseology in this concept is the
understanding of "strategic". All parties in the Western
world (which are defined as all non-communist nations
whether European, the United States or Third World
nations, and whether they participate in the embargo or
not) agree that weapons, ammunitions and most atomic
energy materials are strategic. But many goods, such as
steel and rubber, come under dispute when attempted to be
defined by Western governments. Adl e r-Ka rl s son creates
an "S-NS" axis (Strategic- Non-strategic) which shows the
relative positions of the United States vis-a-vis Western
Europe in their respective desires for defining what
trading export goods qualify as strategic.
Adler-Karlsson shows that even with this dispute
going on between the Western nations, embargoes and
economic warfare were waged against the Soviet Union
during the period from 1947. It could not be shown that
the embargo policy from any single point of view had
produced those results which its spokesmen had hoped it
would. Neither in the economic, the military, nor the
political spheres could it be proven that the embargo had
had any positive effect for the West. Besides, the fact
that Stalin used the embargoes as very evident and
forceful examples of Western hostility to push the
Eastern bloc together in a harsh manner, thereby blaming
the harshness of the policy he anyway had intended to
realize on the Western embargo, and that the Eastern
21
trade monopolies were fairly easily able to facilitate
intra-country trade, as well as smuggling, between
themselves, demonstrates that the West had not benefited
from any aspect of the embargo policies.
Adler-Karlsson concludes that the embargo policy is
very inefficient if not a failure. The Soviet Union used
the sanctions as a political scapegoat to achieve its own
ends in Eastern Europe. The embargo policy has obviously
been a source of irritation in East-West relations to
both sides but it is not possible to show that it has
improved the Western position in the power struggle.
Adler-Karlsson states that, by virtue of learning from
this lesson as well as the lessons of other failed
embargoes, "an embargo policy can hurt but it hardly ever
kills". [271
Abraham Becker concentrates specifically on US
economic leverage on the Soviet Union. Considering
Soviet vulnerability to external economic pressure he
distinguishes three factors: Dtrade participation, e.g.
the percentage of imports in total investments; 2)trade
dependence, which is the Soviet ability to replace
imports by its own production; and 3)trade vulnerability
which he defines as likelihood of having to submit to
foreign pressure. [28] Estimating the effectiveness of the
economic sanctions in terms of US ability to change
Soviet policy A.Becker concludes that neither a policy of
denial (no trade at all) nor that of leverage (rewards -
punishments) can be successful because of Soviet
self-sufficiency and because the United States cannot
expect support from other countries.
22
Michael Mastanduno also analyzes US-Soviet trade
relations. He divides economic controls into threegroups: economic warfare, strategic embargo, andtactical linkage. The economic warfare is intended to
weaken the overall economy of the target state.Strategic embargo denies only items of direct and
specific military utilitv t^h^i i •j mity. lactical linkage seeks toinfluence the target's behavior
.[ 29]
When imposing the sanctions the government of a
sanctioning state has to overcome three sets of
constraints: Dstifle domestic opposition, 2)obtain the
cooperation of other states, and 3)consider the response
of the target (for example, the Cuban and Rhodesian
cases, according to M . Mastanduno
, demonstrated that
economic pressure may stiffen the resistance).
The general conclusion of M . Mastanduno is that only
a strategic embargo is likely to be effective in
influencing Soviet military potential. Economic warfare
and tactical linkage are impossible because of
international and domestic constraints, and because of
relevant Soviet independence from Western sources. At
the same time he remarks that if a state can make
missiles and cannot make grain - selling it the grain
will help it to divert more resources to the missiles
production. That is why "if trade controls are to be
used for strategic purposes, economists have generally
advocated economic warfare - based on the bottleneck
effect - rather than a strategic emba rgo"
. [ 30] Still
M. Mastanduno holds that attempts to use economic
instruments to achieve political objectives, other than
in the form of strategic embargo, are likely to fail.
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Speaking on ineffectiveness of economic sanctions we
should compare them with other tools - military anddiplomatic. Are they more effective? Economic sanctions
are unlikely to achieve spectacular results, but they doprovide an appealing alternative in situations in whichdiplomacy seems too weak and military intervention is too
strong. The US embargo against Cuba did not topple Fidel
Castro, but it weakened the Cuban economy and reduced the
resources available both to Castro and the Soviet
Union. [31] Even when the economic effects of sanctions
are nil, the psychological or political effects may be
worthwhile. They can contribute to isolation and
denunciation of the target. Economic sanctions cannot
destroy the target's regime but they can contribute to
that end.
Economic sanctions can be successful against poor
countries who depend excessively on exports of a single
commodity. The Soviet Union which also depends more and
more on exports of fuels also can be affected by
manipulation of imports from it rather than of exports to
it. Since the US fuels imports from the USSR are minimal
such a manipulation is out of reach of this country. A
lot depends also on a current market situation. However
a US promotion of energy production in the world can
lower fuel prices on the world market and hurt the Soviet
Union more than a grain embargo.
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CHAPTER II
SOVIET INTEREST
1 .£e_a^jis Lor Changing Soviet £cli^
The 1960s were a period of important changes in the
economic structure of the Soviet Union. A gradual
transition from industrial growth through quantitative
increase of labor to growth through increasing labor
productivity and efficiency of production started. The
old way was exhausted. The USSR was getting into a new
phase of intensification. [1] To maintain its previous
economic growth rate the Kremlin needed significant
injections of new technology into the Soviet economy.
Various Eastern European socialist countries came to
grips with the transition problem earlier than the USSR
and in all of them this process was accompanied by
economic and political turmoil. The communist economies
did not provide sufficient incentives to introduce new
technology
- there was no competition, the economies
enjoyed guaranteed markets, there was also little
relationship between research and production. [2]
The Soviet leaders did not learn the lesson and did
not (or could not) prepare their country for the upcoming
changes. They probably were preoccupied with numerous
current problems that had little to do with the economy
like, for example, power struggle before and after
Khruchshev was ousted; or some believed that the enormous
size and resources of Russia would tide them over the
27
28
roubles. Some tried to introduce reforms but failed
ecause of resistance on the part of the Sovietbureaucracy. Since the refor.es were aimed at increase
of rights and responsibilities of local managers at theexpense of the bureaucracy the latter could lose itsprivileged position if the refor.es were carried out.
Meanwhile, the growth rate of utilization of Sovietlabor force by extensive economic development was
obviously higher than the growth of the labor. As a
result, in spite of the continuing growth of the Soviet
economy, the growth rate started to decline. This was an
accelerating process which led to the situation when the
economic growth of the USSR began to fall behind the
world average. In the 1970s the Soviet Union's share in
world production dropped. [3] The Soviet GNP grew at the
rates of:
Year Rate
1960-1965: 5.0%
1965-1970: 5.2%
1970-1975: 3.7%
1975-1980: 2.7*
The growth rate of labor productivity was going down too:
Year Rate
1960-1965:
1965-1970: 3.2%
1970-1975: 2.0*
1975-1980: 1.3%. [4]
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num
In December
1 9 6 9 Leonid Brezhnev said at the Ple,l ,u
of the Central Committee of the CPSU that the Soviet
Union had entered a new stage of economic development
"Until now we could develop our economy by quantitative
factors, i.e. by increasing number of workers involved
into production and increasing capital investments. This
period of extensive development is coming to an end. We
are already experiencing a labor shortage
... . Now we
need an intensification of the economy". [5] At the
Plenum in November 1971 the Central Committee took a
decision to resume directives for Soviet ministries and
enterprises fixing labor productivity tasks. [6]
The importance of increasing labor productivity at
that time was emphasized by decisions of the Five Year
Plans (FYP). During the 8th FYP (1966-1970) 73% of the
increment of industrial production came through
increasing labor productivity. During the 9th FYP
(1971-1975) increasing labor productivity gave 84% of the
increment of industrial production and 80% of national
income. [7] At the 10th FYP (1976-1980) it was necessary
"to pay the most attention to increasing labor
productivity". This was planned to produce 85-90% of the
increment of the national income, 90% of the increment of
industrial production, and 100% of agricultural
production. [8] The target for industrial production was
not fulfilled. Labor productivity gave only 75% of the
increment and the 11th FYP (1981-1985) had the same
target (90%) which set up for the 10th FYP. [9] At the
26th Party Congress (19 81) it was said again that
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"particuiar attention should be paid to increasing labor
Produotivity" and the old task no shift the economy tothe intensive way of development- was set. [10] By andlarge, increases in labor productivity are to be
responsible for almost- an BOI °st all economic growth in the 11th
F I r • L 1 1 J
The technological level of the Soviet economy waslower than that in the West. The ongoing industrial
revolution in the Western countries was not matched in
the USSR. [12] Ironically, Marxists insist that
technological progress under communism will be faster
than under capitalism. [13] Soviet propaganda argues
that socialism in principle facilitates technological
innovations while capitalism by its nature represses it.
[14] The reverse situation was too dangerous for Moscow
to admit both ideologically and militarily.
Under these circumstances, in the late 1960s-early
1970s the Kremlin turned to the West for trade and
technology. This was coupled with efforts to accelerate
technological modernization using its own resources.
[151 A remark made by Soviet Foreign Trade minister
Nikolay Patolichev that "the economic policy of the USSR
toward capitalist countries is an objective economic
need" can be interpreted as an indication that this
turnaround from autarky to broad economic relations with
the capitalist West was made by Soviet leaders against
their will. [16] The turnaround was so sudden that
Soviet ideologues and economists had to defend the thesis
that a broad economic cooperation with capitalist world
did not contradict Marxism-Leninism. [17]
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Many Western scholars hold that the main reason forthis step was the decline in the Soviet rate of economicgrowth. [18] So the Kremlin decided to try the old
Peter-the-Great-approach to Russian economy - to learnfrom the West, to adopt there all the best that can be
used in Russia, to fight the backwardness of its economy
by using Western achievements, to send its own people to
the West to study and even to work in order to get
experience and then to make the same at home. At the end
of the 17th century this approach appeared to be a
success. Why cannot it be a success in the end of the
20th century?
A point should be made here. The Soviets could and
can accomplish a modernization of their economy without
Western technology and other help (credits, management
expertize, etc.). But such a modernization would be
out-of-date (technologically), the process would take
more time, and it would cost more.
Soviet leaders also recognized that their trade with
Eastern Europe had become economically less advantageous.
Raw material and especially fuel prices were growing, but
the Soviet Union continued to supply Eastern Europe with
its materials at a price lower than on the world market
in return for outdated machinery. [19]
The difficulties of satisfying rapidly growing
consumers' demands, uncertainty and instability in
agriculture (though by and large the Soviets enjoyed an
increase of agricultural production, even per capita) had
a political risk. [20] This also pushed Moscow to
expansion of economic relations with the West.
32
Finally, the Slno-Sovlet conflict of the 1960s
reinforced the interest < M «. uin the Soviet Union in
accommodation with the West =>nHon w , and economic ties were
considered a part of the process. [21]
Turning to the West for technology and agricultural
products, Moscow had its own goals. The Kremlin started
economic cooperation not because of a helpless situation
but in order to accelerate and make cheaper its
modernization. Tis means that the USSR is dependent on
the West but not to the degree of vulnerability. At the
same time, by starting such trade the Soviet leaders were
not going to become a Western raw material appendage.
This is well illustrated by the objectives they set in
the cooperation.
One of the goals was to get provisional help in
providing the population with agricultural products until
the problem could be solved by the Soviet Union's own
efforts. So, imports of Western agricultural products
were accepted as a short-term solution. [22]
Another goal was to stimulate economic growth by
injections of modern Western technology and capital
equipment into the Soviet economy. This was seen as a
means to give a new life to the sluggish Soviet economy.
[23] The 11th FYP said that Soviet imports from the West
were aimed at acceleration of the technological progress
and that is why the country should buy only "progressive
equipment" and up-to-date technological processes. [24]
Sushkov
,
Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade,
actually spoke about the necessity of importing the
technological revolution when he declared that economic
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ties with the West allow putting together "the advantages
of the socialist system with the ongoing technological
revolution in the world". He held that in the long runthe ties would accelerate economic development of theSoviet Union. [25] Another high-ranking Soviet official
and economist pointed out that cooperation with the West
was necessary to accelerate scientific-technological
progress of the USSR, to increase labor productivity and
efficiency of production. [26]
An analysis of Soviet economic literature reveals
that in the 1960s-1970s great attention was drawn in the
Soviet Union to careful examination of experience of
other countries (especially Japan) in importing
technology and of its effect on economic performance.
The conclusion of the examinations is that importing
technology is much more advantageous than trying to
invent it all by oneself. The decision to seek trade
cooperation with the West in order to modernize the
Soviet economy was largely the work of Khrushchev. [27]
The third major goal of the Soviet leaders was using
import-led modernization and cheap and vast natural and
labor resources of the USSR to increase exports of
manufactured products, especially machinery, to the West
so that later the Soviet Union would be able to
compensate imports of Western technology by exports of
manufactured goods rather than of fuels and other raw
materials. At the 25th Party congress Leonid Brezhnev
spoke about the necessity of increasing the share of
manufactured goods in Soviet exports. [28] The 11th FYP
also set the task "to improve the structure of Soviet
export by increasing exports of machinery and other
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manufactured goods". [29] The same was pointedi-s by Patol iche v, Sushkov and other high-rankSoviet officials. [30 ] in order to ac hieve the gMoscow created special export enterprises capable ofproducing high-quality goods. [31]
A number of Western students of Soviet foreign trade
also pointed out that the Kremlin wanted to increase
exports of manufactured goods to the West but considered
the task unlikely to be fulfilled for some time. [32]
The cooperation with the West offered Moscow three
means of enhancing economic performance: sophisticated
up-to-date machinery not available in CMEA countries,
advanced technology (production processes covered by
licenses and turnkey plants constructed by foreign
firms), and credits. [331 Trade with the West gave them
a technological short-cut since time and money were not
spent on experimentation and development. [34]
Soviet leaders realized the importance of these
advantages. Nikolay Patolichev wrote that the foreign
economic strategy of the Soviet Union accelerated the
growth of the Soviet economy. The development of
economic ties was getting more and more important for
solving economic problems of the USSR. [35] Especially
was this true for a number of key industries development
of which was boosted by using Western up-to-date
technology. [36]
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The Soviet chemical industry is the
.est conspicuous
example of this. Together with development of machinery
and fuel production the Soviets pay the most attention tothe development of their chemical industry. It took thethird place in percentage share of industrial investment
after machinery and oil and gas industry in the 1960s and1970s. [371 It was clearly one of the first-priority
branches of the Soviet economy. Exports from the West
helped to raise its technological level (especially in
production of mineral fertilizers). [38]
Intensive development of the chemical industry
allows the Kremlin to improve the situation in
agriculture (chemical means of plant protection and pest
control and mineral fertilizers were the first-priority
branches of this first-priority industry). [39] At the
same time, in the mid-1970s 36% of Soviet chemical
equipment was imported. [HO] According to the CIA, the
compensation deals in the industry almost certainly are
permitting it to develop at a rate that could not
otherwise be sustained by the Soviet Union. Western
equipment and technology have made major contributions to
Soviet production of urea fertilizers, complex
fertilizers, and ammonia. [41]
The success in the chemical industry also gave the
Soviets an opportunity to earn badly needed hard currency
by exporting chemical products. The agreement of 1973
with Armand Hammer included building four ammonia plants,
an ammonia pipeline, and other construction and
equipment. This was a long-term compensation deal which
allowed the Soviet Union to pay back in ammonia for what
it got. [42] Now ammonia is an important part of Soviet
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exports to the West. It is the biggest item in Soviet
exports to the is the means of payment tothr countries building chemical enterprises in the
F0f examP^, in the early 1 980s Moscow received
equipment fro. Italy for 12 chemical plants. The paymentfor the equipment is in ammonia. [M 3 J Meanwhile, thedepressed chemical market in Western Europe has alreadybeen hard hit by imports from the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. [44] In the 1980s Soviet exports ofbasic chemicals are expected to grow. [45]
The cooperation with the West also presented to the
USSR a sort of management school. It was an example
teaching Soviet managers how to work. Speaking at the
Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU in December
1972 Brezhnev spoke about one of the examples - the car
plant in Togliatti built with Western help. The
construction of the plant started in 1 967 and in 1970
Moscow already got the first cars. "And what is the most
important, by 1973 all the expenditures for construction
of both the plant and the city will be completely
returned. If we could build other enterprises like that
our economy would develop much faster". [46]
Military application (direct and indirect) of the
acquired Western technology was another plus for the
Kremlin derived from the cooperation. It also made
economic and military espionage easier for the USSR.
The trade with the West gave Moscow a provisional
help in providing the Soviet population with agricultural
products. This was one of the Soviet goals in the trade,
and Western countries were ready to cooperate. Soviet
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imports of agricultural products were constantly growing
In this area the Soviets in the short run were not
vulnerable, though. The Soviet food difficulties did not
stem from a decline of food products per capita.
Throughout the period of 1960s-1970s Soviet agricultural
production per capita was growing. Still, Soviet
agricultural imports also increased. The first Soviet
major grain purchase was in 1 96 4 (about 10mmt). Then the
USSR imported approximately 1.5 mmt annually. In 1 972
after an unusually bad harvest Moscow bought 19 mmt of
grain from the USA and smaller purchases from other
states. [47] Since then grain imports grew from year to
year depending on a particular year's harvest and
reaching in the mid-1980s 40-50 mmt a year. Other
agricultural imports (especially meat, butter, even
potatoes) also increased.
There are a number of explanations of the situation.
One of them points to an ambitious Soviet goal of
enriching the diet of Soviet people. According to this
explanation, the agricultural imports are aimed at an
increase of production of meat, milk, etc. per capita.
[48] They were not caused by any sort of hunger. From
this point of view, any Western economic (agricultural)
sanctions against the Soviet Union are practically
futile. They can slow down the implementation of the
Soviet goal but cannot cause a crisis situation which
would push the Soviets to make concessions.
Another explanation which supplements the first one
points to the fact that expanding agricultural production
cannot meet growing demands of the Soviet people. Such a
situation could lead to popular discontent. This forced
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the Soviet leaders to work out and pursue the goal of
enriching the Soviet diet and at the same time to importfarm products as a short-run expedient. [i» 9 ] Some Soviet
scholars also wrote about this phenomenon in their
country. V.Tikhonov, for example, said in 1977 thatdemands on agricultural products had a higher growth rate
in the USSR than agricultural production. [50] This
situation increases Soviet vulnerability to Western
agricultural sanctions but only if the latter continue
for a long period of time.
The third explanation also comes from both Soviet
and Western sources. At the Plenum of the Central
Committee in December 1977 Brezhnev said that Soviet
agricultural production per capita was constantly growing
but at the same time the country experienced a lack of
agricultural products. According to the former Soviet
leader, the major reason for this was a huge wastage in
agriculture. [51] Soviet sources do not provide data on
the scale of this phenomenon but probably it is
underestimated in the West. The Economist Intelligence
Unit (EIU) in its World Outlook in February 1980 said
that wastage in Soviet agriculture accounts for 12% or
more of total availabilities of grain, including imports.
The Soviet Union uses 70% more grain as animal feed than
the EEC although it has only 40$ more cattle, 32% more
poultry, and fewer pigs. Despite having 40? more cattle,
the Soviet Union produces only 13? more of beef and 6%
less milk than the EEC. [52] The figure on "Waste and
Losses" given by the CIA for different years is higher
than that provided by the European experts. [53] But
this is what the Soviet leader said about the waste: "If
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cut short the waste at least in half then the need ofthe country in grain will be satisfied". [5 A]Doe s thismean that the waste approximately equals double grainimports of the Soviet Union? If it is so then even the
most pessimistic Western calculation of the Soviet waste
is smaller than the real picture.
Given the nature of the Soviet regime, it is hard to
assume that the Kremlin spends its precious hard currency
for agricultural imports just in order to improve thediet of Soviet people. Apparently, the Soviet leaders
have to do so. This increases their vulnerability to
Western agricultural sanctions. On the other hand, the
problem of the Soviet Union is not hunger. That is why
the USSR may be vulnerable to long-term agricultural
sanctions rather than to short-term ones of the sort of
the grain embargo of 1980-1981.
In any event, the economic cooperation with the West
allows Moscow to ease up economic and social constraints
inside the country without resorting to too risky
decisive reforms. The imports from the West (industrial,
technological, and agricultural) help Moscow cope with a
number of economic, military, social, and political
problems. All this can be considered as Moscow's gains
from the economic ties.
3.£o_y_L£i Conc ern.
In analyzing East-West economic relations Western
scholars usually emphasize Pro et Contra of the
cooperation for the Western countries and different gains
the USSR derives from it. The Contra of the ties for the
Soviet side are often neglected. Meanwhile, there are a
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number of negative Points for the Soviet Union as well
which can diminish the enthusiasm of the Soviet elitetoward the cooperation or beef up the anti-cooperationfaction of it.
As has been said, the trade allows Moscow to avoid
or postpone decisive economic and social reforms (as, for
example, an introduction of a limited form of private
property in agriculture which, according to some, candramatically improve the situation in Soviet agriculture
[551). Such reforms can be a source of political
contamination that makes them too dangerous for the
position and privileges of Soviet bureaucracy. On the
other hand, the expanded ties with the West also are a
source of political contamination. They have to be
accompanied by increasing influx of Westerners into the
Soviet Union and frequent travels of Soviet specialists
to the West. All this widens the contacts of Soviet
people not only with Western technological ideas but with
political ones as well.
The Soviets also are experiencing difficulties in
absorbing the Western capital already acquired. This is
another factor reducing Soviet interest in economic
cooperation. Reluctance of cautious Soviet managers and
bureaucrats to take risks brings about little incentives
to introduce sophisticated imported (as well as domestic)
technology. Introduction of some processes acquired
under Western licenses takes an unusually long time. The
purchased technology is not widely disseminated in a
particular industry and some imported goods just are not
used. [56] The slowness of assimilation and diffusion of
foreign technology and goods has been widely noted in the
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USSR. [ 57 ] L.Brainard called this "the Indigestionproblem" of the Wi.f 5110111 Soviet economic system. [58]Difficult!., in providing back-up supplies and managementfor the introduction of Western technology contributed tothe problem. [59]
One of the Soviet goals in the economic cooperation
with the West was to stimulate development and
modernization of the Soviet economy by using imports of
modern technology and machinery. But due to the nature
of the economic and political system the economic growth
had a relatively low rate. The growth rate of industrial
production in the 1960s-1970s was as follows:
Year Rate
1960-1965: 6.6$
1965-1970: 6.3%
1970-1975: 5.9%
1975-1980: 3.6$ [60]
If before the mid-1970s annual real growth of GNP in
the Soviet Union was higher than in the USA, then in
1976-1981 it was already lower (3.5? in the USA and 2.9%
in the USSR). [61] Most Western observers expect the
1980s too to be a decade of slow growth for the Soviet
economy. [62] Apparently, imports from the West cannot
be a solution of the problem without a reorganization of
the Soviet economic system at the same time. The failure
to fulfill this goal coupled with a parallel failure of
import-led growth in Poland can also contribute to a
decline of willingness of the Soviet elite to continue
the cooperation with the West.
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Speaking of import-led economic growth of the SovietUnion one should not overemphasize the significance ofWestern exports to that country. The Soviets do not have
enough hard currency to start a large-scale import-led
modernization. I„ the beginning Qf the 198()s ^Soviet imports equaled about 12-131 of Soviet GNP, whilethose from the West
- only about 5%. [6 3 ] At the sametime the portion of Soviet high technology i mp0 rts fromthe West was relatively small, which further reduces
Moscow's vulnerability to "high technology sanctions".
For example, by one definition of high technology
products developed by the US Department of Commerce, the
USSR imported about $2.3 billion of high technology items
in 1980 or only about 12% of the total value of 1980
Soviet imports from the industrial West. [64] The
problem here was not only obstacles to high technology
exports to the Soviet Union made by Western governments
for politico-military reasons but a hard currency crunch
on the part of the USSR as well. The necessity to import
substantial amounts of agricultural products from the
West aggravated the situation. Time and again Soviet
representatives said that without credits there would be
no substantial trade with the West. [65] On the other
hand, influx of Western credits could stimulate Soviet
imports only in the beginning. lLater the necessity to
return the debts would lead to a sort of a balance
between new credits and payments for previous ones. This
fact, together with Poland's experience, made the Kremlin
pursue a more cautious credit policy. The real source of
hard currency for the USSR was fuels and other raw
materials exports. But, as it has been said, Moscow
resented the idea of becoming a raw material appendage of
^3
the West.
That is why another major goal of Soviet leaders wasto increase exports of manufactured products in order to
earn foreign exchange badly needed to pay for imports.
This brings us to the necessity of examining major trends
of Soviet foreign trade during the 1970s- early 1980s(the time of intensive influx of Western technology into
the Soviet Union). The primary source on the question is
the Soviet statistical yearbook "Vneshnjaja Torgovlja
SSSR". In order to answer the question to what degree
the Soviets were successful in fulfilling their goal all
categories of Soviet imports and exports given in the
statistical collection were divided into four groups:
manufactured products which include machinery,
equipment, means of transportation, chemical products',
and industrial consumer goods given in tables 9 and 10 of
the Soviet statistical collection. This does not include
metals and metal products and products of the pulp and
paper industry which are in other groups in the Soviet
collection. It was not possible to calculate them
separately in other tables and then to add them into my
figures of "manufactured products" because the other
tables are incomplete. The other three groups are:
2) Agricultural
,
timber, and related products, 3)Fuels and
electric energy, and M)0res, metals, and metal products.
The data show that Soviet imports and exports of
manufactured products grew constantly during the period
(imports - from 7732 million rubles (mr) in 1972 to 29052
mr in 1982 and exports - from 3820 mr to 11306 mr
respectively). But at the same time the Soviets bought
more manufactured products than they sold and the gap
in
between imports and exports of the products wasincreasing. If in 1 972 the dIfference
imports and the exports was 3912 mr, then in 1982 it was
already 177*6 mr
.
In 1972 Soviet exports of manufacturedproducts paid for < 9 .U of imports of the products and in
1982
-
only for 38.9%. This indicates that so far the
Kremlin has failed in its efforts to increase exports of
manufactured goods so that the latter could compensate
for growing imports.
The exports of ores, metals, timber, and
agricultural products grew even more slowly and could not
fulfill the task either. Their share in general Soviet
exports was declining constantly. The same can be said
about the manufactured products. The fuels were the only
item whose share in general Soviet export increased
greatly (from 17.7? in 1972 to 52.3% in 1982). This
compensated for all increases in Soviet imports.
The situation with machinery, the most important
part of manufactured products, was even worse. In 1972
its exports covered 65. 2% of Soviet imports of machinery
and in 1982 - 42.0%. So the decline was even faster than
the average of manufactured goods in general (from 49.H
in 1 972 to 38. 9% in 1 982)
.
The USSR was more successful in promoting its
exports of chemical products, another part of
manufactured goods. In 1972 exports of chemicals
reimbursed 64. H% of the imports while in 1982 - already
78.9%. This might be an example when improvement of
Soviet chemical industry with Western help really led to
increases of its exports which outpaced growing imports
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and thus hurt producers of chemical products in the West.Without Western technological injections into the Soviet
chemical industry in the 1970s, the West could export
more chemical products to the Soviet Union and the Soviet
competition on the world chemical market would beinsignificant. But still, in 1982 the Soviets imported
more chemical products than they exported. So the
result here is that the position of the West is not bad
but could be even better without technological injections
into the Soviet economy.
The same can probably be said about agricultural
products. Massive purchases of Western machinery for
Soviet agriculture and fertilizer industry have not yet
led to a stable decline of Soviet imports of agricultural
products, though the imports in all likelihood would be
higher if the West refused to sell its machinery and
technology for Soviet agriculture and fertilizer
industry. But even with Western willingness to sell the
technology, the share of agricultural products in general
Soviet imports grew (though insignificantly) from 23.
U
in 1 972 to 26. 8% in 1 982. In 1981 that share was even
higher (31.2?), but it is hard to say how stable the
declining trend was. In this sector of the Soviet
economy still too much depends on weather conditions
though there is no doubt that Western technology and
fertilizers help improve the situation. This in the long
run can bring about a reduction of Soviet agricultural
imports
.
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It is more relevant to the major question of the
work to examine trends of Soviet trade with non-Communist
countries rather than with the world in general. On the
other hand, it seems unnecessary to single out onlyWestern developed countries because Soviet trade with the
Third World also affected Western producers by presenting
an additional competition in the markets of less
developed countries.
The Soviet statistical collection does not provide
data directly necessary for our analysis, but it can be
calculated from different tables of the yearbooks.
Tables 9 and 10 give the distribution of Soviet exports
and imports to and from socialist countries as a
percentage of total Soviet trade with these countries.
Table 3 shows Soviet exports and imports from this area
in rubles. So, we can calculate the distribution of
Soviet trade with Communist countries in rubles. Then
subtraction of Soviet export or import of a particular
commodity to and from the Communist region in rubles from
general Soviet export or import of the same commodity
will give us the distribution of Soviet trade with
non-Communist countries in rubles. Using that figure we
can also calculate the distribution of specific
commodities as a percentage of total Soviet trade with
non-Communist area.
When we compare general Soviet imports with those
from non-Communist areas, the most conspicuous thing is
that if in the Soviet general imports manufactured
products dominated throughout all the period under
consideration, then the same imports from non-Communist
countries were three-four times smaller and developed
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almost in a parallel manner with agricultural imports.
On the one hand, this points out the insignificance of
the imports of manufactured products from the West for
the Soviet Union in terms of their ratio (in monetary
expression) to general Soviet imports of the products and
to the Soviet GNP. This might indicate Soviet
self-sufficiency, relative independence, and
invulnerability from Western sanctions pertaining to
exports of manufactured products. On the other hand,
high quality, uniqueness, and urgent need for a number of
particular Western manufactured goods make them more
important for the Soviet economy than the ratio can
indicate. Time and again Soviet leaders point to a great
importance of Western products, especially
technologically advanced ones, to the Soviet economy
regardless of their relatively small share in Soviet
imports. [66]
Other new trends in Soviet trade are increases of
metal and metal products and even fuels in imports.
While the shares of manufactured and agricultural
products by and large declined from 39. 4% in 1 972 to
35.8% in 1982 for manufactured products and from 39.8% to
35.2% for agricultural products, those of fuels increased
from 4.1% to 7.8% and of metals - from 11.2% to 14.7%.
The increase for fuels may be explained by the oil price
hike of 1 979 (though the price rise in 1 97 3 did not
affect negatively the Soviet import at all). Besides,
the upward trend of fuel expenditures in the late 1970s
was accompanied by sharp increases of Soviet revenues
from fuel exports. On the other hand, this can reflect
the difficulties the Kremlin is experiencing with its
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metallurgy and energy sector.
Soviet exports of manufactured products to
non-communist countries grew constantly and evenly but
much slower than to the world, including Soviet
satellites. I n 1972 Soviet exports of manufactured
products paid for 52. 7% of the imports of the same
products from the non-Communist area, while in 1 9 82 -
only for 35. 8%. The share of manufactured products in
Soviet exports dropped from 22. n in 1 972 to 1 1 3% in
1982.
The structure of Soviet exports to the non-Communist
world in 1982 was much worse than in 1972, i.e. before
the significant injections of Western technology into the
Soviet economy. If in 1972 all four grQups Qf exports
were rather close to each other, then in 1982 only one
group (fuels) dominated Soviet exports. This means that
so far the Kremlin has failed to fulfill its goal of
increasing the role of manufactured products in its
exports. This also means that in case of a reduction of
Soviet fuel export revenues Moscow will not be able to
maintain the current level of imports from Western
countries. Accordingly, the West cannot count on the
Soviet Union being a great market for Western goods in
the future. The question is how far into the future the
Soviets will be able to keep up their high level of
energy exports.
The influx of Western technology has not brought
about substantial increases of Soviet exports of
manufactured products, but from 1978 the growth rate of
Soviet imports of these products started to slow down.
19
This was probably due to the lack of hard currency andincreasing purchases of agricultural products in the late
1 970s
.
Being unable to increase the share of manufactured
products in its exports Moscow had to rely more heavily
on exports of fuels. But in order to increase oil and
gas production it had to distract resources from
development of machinery and other industries to fuel
exploration. In the 1960s-1970s investments into the oil
and gas industry as a percentage share of total
industrial investments were constantly growing at the
expense of other branches of industry:
lr_e_od_s in Investment Zriox;
(percentage share of industrial investment)
Oil and gas industry
Year Rate
1959-1965: 11.6%
1966-1970: 12.9?
1971-1975: 13.8%
1976-1979: 17.4% [67]
The failure to increase exports of manufactured
products and becoming a raw material appendage of the
West may become another factor discouraging the Kremlin
from trade.
Though the USSR was not vulnerable to short-term
economic sanctions, its increasing dependency on the
West, especially on agricultural imports, contradicted in
the eyes of Soviet leaders the traditional autarchical
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approach to foreign economic relations. Being subject to
economic sanctions raised a desire of Soviet leaders to
regain maximum economic independence.
The analysis of negative (for Soviet leaders)
aspects of the cooperation with Western countries does
not mean that Moscow would decide to return to the level
of trade of the 1950s-1 960s. But a more cautious
approach of the Kremlin may become an additional factor
slowing down a further growth of trade. The Soviets may
double their efforts to reduce the agricultural
dependency of the West. They may import Western
technology more cautiously and selectively and pursue a
more conservative credit policy.
^- Sov i el £ajsJ^W£_s_t InaHe. £o_lic_y.
In order to counter the negative aspects of economic
cooperation and to maximize the positive ones Moscow has
worked out a specific foreign trade policy. An analysis
of Soviet writings on foreign trade shows the existence
of two points of view on the question of trade with the
West. [68] Due to the nature of the Soviet political
regime which requires conformity it is difficult to
single out individuals or groups in the Soviet elite
taking this or that stance, though such attempts have
been made. [691 But it is possible to characterize two
approaches to the foreign trade in the Soviet Union.
The first point of view is the continuation of the
old policy of autarky. It tends to the position that the
USSR should import from the West only items absolutely
essential to Soviet economic development and should
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export only in order to earn foreign exchange needed topay for the imports.
The second point of view tends to the stance thatthe Soviet Union should export as much as it can in order
to buy more up-to-date technology. Imports of
non-technological goods (like grains, etc.) and outdated
manufactured products should be cut down and replaced by
Soviet production. At the same time the Soviet Union
should increase exports of manufactured goods. This
point of view was associated with the idea of import-led
growth
.
Let us consider the two positions in more detail.
The first one dominated Soviet bureaucracy until the
1960s. In the 1960s-1970s it yielded to the second view
but in the 1980s, after Poland's experience and after
realizing that expanded influx of Western technology into
the Soviet did not bring about essential results, it
probably regained some of its popularity. Though the
second view still prevails among the Soviet elite, it is
influenced by a more cautious and restrained approach to
trade
.
William Turpin characterized the first policy as
autarky. It required the greatest possible economic
self-sufficiency and reduction of trade with the
capitalist West as mach as possible. He wrote that the
Soviet Union was determined to avoid dependence on
foreign and particularly Western sources of supply while
remaining free to use the Western market for tactical and
strategic advantages. Such a policy requires Moscow to
limit imports only to goods of vital importance which
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cannot be produced at home or can be produced ininsufficient quantities. [ 7 0] Though Soviet imports of
manufactured products are relatively mo dest they are
allocated typically in priority sectors to help relieve
critical bottlenecks. [ 71] Another feature of ^
policy is that the Soviets try to import machinery and
equipment that produces products rather than the products
themselves. [72]
In 1968 Gosplan (Soviet State committee on planning)
sent a directive called "provisional methodology of
determining economic effectiveness of foreign trade" to
state controlled Soviet foreign trade institutions. It
said that only those items that were essential for the
increase of the economic and technical level of the
Soviet Union could be imported. Import also was supposed
to provide Soviet economy with goods production of which
could cost more than import. As for exports, it was
supposed to compensate the currency spent on the imports.
[731
Such a policy definitely restrained Soviet trade.
It controlled the trade by implicit export and import
quotas that made it possible for Moscow to have low
tariffs. [74] Though the first point of view does not
prevail now it still affects Soviet foreign trade policy.
The second point of view has prevailed in the Soviet
foreign trade policy since the late 196 0s. Leonid
Brezhnev was one of the champions of the new policy. He
connected it with the need to enter a new stage of
intensive economic growth. Ties with the West were seen
by him as essential for promoting technological
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innovations in the Soviet Union. [75]
The proponents of this point of view spoke out for
expansion of economic relations between the East and theWest and tried to influence Western public opinion towardthis goal. The Soviet Union started the campaign forincreasing trade in the 1950s when a need for Western
technology was emerging. [76] By the 1970s when the need
for the technology increased and the idea became more
popular in Moscow the campaign was widened. Soviet
propaganda set forth different arguments for increasing
trade. This helps to affect Western public opinion. For
example, the argument that the American allies trade with
the Soviet Union and the USA loses lucrative orders was
used by Soviet propaganda as far back as in the 1950s.
[77] Soviet propaganda vigorously maintains the arguments
that economic cooperation strengthens peace, gives jobs
in Western countries, etc. [78] The Kremlin insists that
it always has tried to reach broad cooperation with the
West but capitalist governments stood in the way of it
and only by the 1970s numerous successes of the Soviet
Union in development of economy, technology, and science
forced the West to start trade with the USSR. [79]
In its foreign trade the Soviet Union prefers
long-term economic relations. Probably its bureaucratic
inertia and sluggishness push it in this direction. It
is very difficult for their huge bureaucratic machine to
operate in a situation changing fast. Western
businessmen say that the Soviets prefer doing business
with people whom they are used to. [80] Besides,
long-term stable relations cannot disrupt their economic
plans. [81] The Kremlin always emphasizes that it is a
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reliable and stable partner r *oi
Airri
P . [82] Despite thedifficulties in the energy sector Moscow insists that itwill have enough fuels for itself and exports. [8 3 ]
In its relations with the West Moscow tries to
separate economic questions from political and military
ones. [84] It insists that development of trade should
not depend on the pol i tical si tua tion . Doing this the
Kremlin uses widely the thesis of impermissibility tointerfere in the internal affairs of other states. [8 5 ]
According to Moscow, using trade for achieving foreign
policy objectives has no future, economic sanctions are
always ineffective. [86] It denies the thesis that the
Soviet Union needs trade relations more than the West
[87]
There is a great deal of hypocrisy and double
standard in this stance. In the first place, trade and
foreign aid have always been tied with political goals.
[88] In many cases economic sanctions have been
effective. Best known examples of this are the oil
embargo of 1973, British economic sanctions against Iran
in 1953, etc. Second, the Soviet Union has often
resorted to economic sanctions as an instrument of
political pressure against other states. In 1956 it
stopped oil shipments to Israel, in the early 1960s it
reduced exports and withheld spare parts to apply
political pressure on China, it delayed trade
negotiations to influence Finland's domestic politics in
1958, it encouraged the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974,
praised the 1967 oil embargo against the United States,
Great Britain, and West Germany, calling it "a concrete
and effective expression of Arab solidarity". The
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Kremlin persuaded the Arab states to continue the embargo
when the Arabs wanted to call it off. [8 9]On September
5, 1973, "Pravda" wrote: "In light of the energy
crisis.... the importance of oil as an economic factor
is constantly increasing. As a result, additional
opportunities are being created for the Arab countries to
use this important lever for political ends". Leonid
Brezhnev said at the 25th party congress: "We consider
our foreign economic relations as an effective means of
reaching both economic and political goals". [90] A
high-ranking Soviet official wrote: "Economic and
political factors determine selection of Soviet trade
partners". [ 9 1] "The international political
significance of foreign economic ties of the Soviet Union
is increasing"
- declared the Soviet Foreign trade
minister. [92] The Soviet Union was one of the most
ardent advocates of imposing economic sanctions against
Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1980-1981 the USSR's
export of oil and oil products to the USA plummeted from
160 million rubles in 197 9 to 30 thousand rubles in 1981.
Actually this was an oil embargo in retaliation for the
US grain embargo. [93]
In its foreign economic strategy the Soviet Union
widely uses competition between different countries
trying to achieve both economic and political goals. The
political goal is to divide the Western countries, to
cause frictions and controversy between them. [94]
Economically the Soviets develop cooperation with weaker
firms and countries, giving them lucrative orders and
tempting stronger countries by the argument "others trade
and you lose good orders". This propaganda argument, by
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the way the Soviets applied not only to the United
es hut to Western European countries and Jap an as
the USA"
StPategy 15
"
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The predicament of being a subject of economic
sanctions especially in the agricultural sector
reinforced the autarchial tendency in Soviet policy. Now
Moscow tries (so far unsuccessfully) to reduce foodimports from the West. In May 1 9 82 L.Brezhnev introduced
the so called Agricultural program. He stressed "the
need to reduce imports of foodstuffs from capitalist
countries". [95] The Soviet leaders do not set the goal
of food self-sufficiency, though. Apparently they
consider such a goal unfeasible for the time being The
11th FYP (1981-1985) set the goal of "reliable provision
of the country with agricultural products" thus avoiding
the term "self-sufficiency" either. [96] At the same
time Moscow tries to diversify food imports sources.
[97]
An important aspect of Soviet foreign trade policy
is stubborn political and economic pressure on the USA in
order to gain the status of a most favorable nation.
[98] According to some Western specialists, it will not
increase significantly Soviet exports as most of them are
raw materials and basic chemicals which are subject to
either no or very low tariffs. The exports of Soviet
manufactured products are probably hampered more by poor
quality and insufficient service than by the tariffs.
[99] The explanation of Moscow's attempt to gain MFN
status lies in the fact that it takes seriously its goal
of increasing exports of manufactured goods in the
57
future. In addition, they can use the denial of the MFN
status for propaganda purposes pointing to "the bad will"
of the USA
.
Because of its inability to produce competitive
goods for export the Soviets are seeking new forms of
cooperation which are supposed to boost Soviet exports of
manufactured products. They most prefer two models-
compensation deals and the joint venture model.
In the compensation model the Western supplier is
repaid through production of the plant or equipment
supplied. The agreement provides for a Western long-term
credit which covers delivery to the Soviet Union of
machinery, equipment, materials, puts Western licenses at
Soviet disposal, and an obligation to buy in the Soviet
Union a part of the enterprise's production (usually
20-30% of it every year) during a long term (10-15
years). The Western purchases of the product cover the
full amount of the credit together with interest. So,
the Soviets do not have to pay for the construction of
the enterprise at all and can have 70-80% of its products
during 10-15 years and 100% of the products after that
period. The object remains the property of the USSR
during the whole period and the Soviet side does not
share the profits from exploitation of it with a foreign
company. Compensation deals usually include three
agreements: on export of equipment to the Soviet Union
(which is covered by Western credit), on import of the
product from the Soviet Union in compensation for the
Western credit, and the credit agreement. [100]
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The compensation deals can be divided into two
groups: the stretched compensation when the Western
supplier provides equipment, products, and technology forbuilding an object in the Soviet Union and then gets apart of the products in compensation; and the turn-key
compensation when the Western suppl ier enti rel y builds
the object. [101] The Soviets also are looking for a new
type of credits for compensation projects: the credit
redeemable only if the project is successful. i m 1975
they got this type of credit from Japan for development
of the oil-gas deposits on the Sakhalin Island. [102]
The significance of the compensation deals for the
Soviet Union is rather high: it provides free capital,
technology, and expertize. The compensation projects
brought about a substantial increase of production in the
Soviet Union of basic chemicals and raw materials. They
sharply increase labor productivity in a number of
industries, allow Moscow to save capital investments and
to direct them into other areas (including military), and
the last but not the least, they increase and guarantee
future Soviet exports. [103]
The number of compensation deals is growing, so are
Soviet exports of "compensation products", but almost all
major agreements are for raw materials or basic
chemicals, such as urea, ammonia, polyethylene. [104]
The Kremlin wants such compensation deals which will
increase its industrial exports. This was plainly and
categorically put many times by Soviet leaders,
high-ranking officials, party congresses. [105]
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0bEt- le t0 this is that the cessationSoviet debt takes a iong period of time. During theti- the products (if they are not raw materials) become
obsolete and marketing of them in the West falls below
expectations. This fans Western businessmen away f rom
compensation deals with the Russians in manufactured
products. [106]
The Kremlin sees a way out of the situation in
industrial coproduction with Western firms. [107] It put
forward another, joint venture model. The Soviets
started to study possibility of joint ventures in the
late 1 960s- early 1 970s. [108]
In this model Western partners typically provide
technology, managerial skills, market, and capital, and
the Soviet Union provides labor and raw materials. [109]
So this is another way to get through to the Western
market but now with manufactured goods. This form of
cooperation stands between the compensation model and
direct investments of a foreign firm into the economy of
a home-country. After construction of an object the
foreign company continues to participate in the
production process, getting for this a part of the
products. The foreign company provides also the market
and being involved into production process, elaborates
the products, introduces new technology, increases labor
productivity. So the product does not become obsolete,
otherwise the Western company finds it difficult to
market it. At the same time the Soviet side giving only
its cheap labor and raw materials gets the rest of the
products. The part of the products which goes to the
foreign company is used as means of repayment of Soviet
IS
s
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debt and as a compensation for the continuing Western
management
.
The major difference from the compensation model 4that the West not only builds and object but provide,
management and engineering too. It is rather importantfor the Soviets since more than the technology itself theSoviet Union needs Western management system to get
maximum effect from the purchased technology. [1 10 ]
The coproduction increases Soviet industrial
exports, it gives up-to-date technology, allows saving
capital investments for other industries. It also gives
the Soviet Union managerial skills and reduces the time
required for assimilation of the latest technology. I n
this form the West constantly helps the Soviet Union to
elaborate production. [111]
On the other hand, the Western firms are attracted
to this form of cooperation by the possibility of using
cheap Soviet labor and raw materials. Unlike the areas
of cooperation in the compensation model the cooperation
in the joint-venture model covers machinery, including
aviation, agricultural machinery, means of
transportation, oil and gas equipment, electronics,
nuclear energy, plasma welding, and consumer goods such
as color TVs
, etc . [112]
In addition to these two forms of cooperation the
Soviets write about joint Soviet-Western companies for
marketing Soviet goods and for joint research. They also
lease Western machinery instead of buying it. But these
forms are not widely used. [113]
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the same time thp ^nu-i^f n •e Soviet Union remains relativelyinvulnerable to short-term economic sanctions.
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CHAPTER in
US INTEREST
1 .Ee-ajLcms Lor £liaii£in£ US £o_lic^
If the Soviet Union turned to cooperation with theWest mostly for economic reasons, the United States gotinto cooperation wit the Soviet Union for political ones.
In the 1960s, especially after the Cuban missile crisis
of 1962, the idea of preventing by all means a nuclear
war with the USSR gradually occupied many minds in the
West. New doctrines of relations between Western
democracies and the Soviet Union were being worked out.
One of the most influential and pervasive was the
idea associated with the name of Henry Kissinger,
transition from the policy of confrontation to
negotiations and cooperation with Moscow. Now this was
considered possible because unlike in the previous times
the Soviet Union was no longer seen as a revolutionary
state. It was a status quo power preoccupied (after
Stalin's death) with internal problems of economic
development and raising the standard of living.
Ideological clashes with communist China were a clear
evidence of that.
These changes in Soviet policy coincided with the
transition of the country's economy from extensive to
intensive ways of development. The Soviet Union
definitely experienced some troubles coping with the
problem. Even in the 1950s it displayed willingness to
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expand economic cooperation with the West.
All this provided a golden opportunity for theUnited States to give the Sovl-t. * u iK ie s a helping hand in orderto stimulate the country's further departure from strict
revolutionary ideology, to get in exchange some political
concessions, to stop Russian expansionism, and ultimately
to secure peace in the world at a time when the third
world war became unthinkable.
As a result of such cooperation Moscow was supposed
to become tied to the West so much that a disruption of
the ties would be too painful and unacceptable for Soviet
leaders. This could give the USA a possibility to
manipulate Soviet policy by giving economic benefits for
"good behavior" and withdrawing them for a continuation
of expansionist foreign or repressive domestic policy.
[1] On the other hand, the United States could not get
tied to the Soviet economy significantly because of
American economic superiority and greater flexibility.
That is why a possible temporary disruption of the
economic relations with the Soviet Union would not be
painful to the United States.
By that time major American allies had already been
involved in profitable cooperation with Moscow. Western
Europe and Japan depend on foreign trade more than the
USA. A number of branches of their industries sold the
bulk of their production th the East. [2] That is why US
allies have been traditionally reluctant to apply export
controls to the USSR and why they exerted pressure on the
USA to abolish such attempts. [3]
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seen ^ TT" ^ -as h av lng an enormous potential. The Soviet Unionis the biggest country in the world, with great natur
resources most of which have not been tapped yet In the
-e 1 960s the USA lo .tlti 0ll sel f-suf fLLy . '
the early 1970s the energy crisis emerged as one of itshottest problems. The quest for raw materials
especially fuels, also pushed Ameplcan ^^
firms to develop relations with the Soviet Union. TheUSSR was seen as a possible alternative source of energy
which could cushion Arab oil blackmail. The West coulddiversify fuel imports, reducing dependence on the Middle
East and thus balancing between the Arabs and the
Russi ans
.
At the same time the cheap labor force in the Soviet
Union, the absence of strikes and independent
unpredictable labor unions made the country a reliable
safe partner and cooperation with it in labor-intensive,
raw materials-intensive areas a lucrative one.
The relations with the USSR apparently have been
profitable for US business. In the mid-1970s MOO US
firms dealing with Moscow were polled about Soviet trade.
The majority chose not to respond. 168 responded. Of
them 7H% evaluated the experience of their companies in
the Soviet market as profitable. 9% reported significant
loses. But, probably, other losers had chosen not to
respond. [4]
The Western firms' willingness to expand relations
with the USSR was interpreted by the Soviets in a Marxist
way: the leading force of a capitalist's actions is the
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pr?u This makes him de- iop -ia" 0 „ s „ ithocialist countries. [5]
with
faCt0P PUShlng ^^^^ t0 C °°P-atethe Russians was that the relations were often based
on credits guaranteed by the government. [6] This
reduced the risk of such a cooperation passing it overfrom the firm and the bank to taxpayers. After the OPEC
countries raised oil prices in the 1970s, Western banks
had great liquidities as oil producers deposited most of
their assets in Western banks. [7] At the same time
borrowings in the West were hampered by the recession of
the 1970s which many link to the same oil price hikes
In this situation the banks were eager to loan money to
other (including socialist) countries. The latter were
considered even more reliable than the Third world.
The continuing Vietnam war, political instability
and turmoil inside the USA, newly shaky position of the
US dollar in the early 1970s, recession and unemployment
which became an acid political issue, growing surpluses
of agricultural products, deteriorating position of the
American farmers
- all these factors brought about an
intense pressure on the US government on the part of
businesses, banks, farmers' organizations, and political
groups advocating detente in order to start a new
economic policy toward the Communist East and follow the
course already set by American allies.
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2. 112 a^neXits and Cojic_e_riL&
The expanded economic relations had their «P ro etContra" for the USA as well as for the USSR. ThQuestion of trade with the Soviet Union evo.ed intense
ontroversy in the USA after the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan and the imposition of martial law in Poland
This question was important in US relations with Moscowduring the Carter administration even before the
Afghanistan occupation. It still dominates (together
with military issues) the US approach to the Soviets.
The importance of the issue stems from the fact that
it is not only economic but also (and even more so) a
political question. It is connected with another, bigger
one: to what extent can the USA use economic sanctions
as a political weapon in its relations with a major
adversary
- the Soviet Union. If it cannot be used as a
political tool what else (short of war) can be done in
response to another Soviet aggression? The issue becomes
particularly complicated because it affects US relations
with its allies.
As a first step to comprehending it we can
systematize the positions of the opponents and proponents
of economic ties with the USSR. This can clarify our own
position and add to a better understanding of the
problem
.
Proponents of trade with the USSR have pointed out a
number of economic and political reasons for the
development of such trade. Economically, they held, the
USA as well as the free world in general benefit from
this trade. It improves the trade balance of the USA as
or I-"'
t0
^
S °Viet
-Ports. Elimination of this trade would lead to an
-creasing deficit of the US trade balance. Besides, allin all the Soviet Union is an attractive market. [8]
Trade with Soviet Russia increases employment in theUnited States, providing thousands of jobs in the
country. It guarantees future orders in the form of
additional service, spare parts, etc. The trade may
relieve the difficult situation of American farmers
caused by the surpluses of grain in the United States
Even with low grain prices they would gain from large
sales to the Soviet Union. Refusal to trade with Moscow
for political reasons will not bring about significant
pressure on the Russians as American competitors
especially the Western Europeans and Japanese continue to
develop economic relations with the Soviets and the
United States loses big orders. Such a situation reduces
American competitiveness on the world market. Economic
sanctions against the Soviet Union are "shooting
ourselves in the foot" as Moscow loses less than the
United States. Such sanctions do not change Soviet
behavior but do seriously damage the US economy.
Economic sanctions are just futile because the Soviet
Union is relatively self-sufficient. [9]
It is necessary to help the USSR to develop its
energy sector, it is said. This would prevent Moscow
from becoming a competitor of the West for the Middle
East's oil. World oil supplies would be increased and
that might slow down the oil price rises. In general,
stimulation of oil production outside OPEC will bring
about a reduction of the West's dependency on this
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politically unstable organization. In thla £ense ^Soviet Union is an alternative to OPEC
, Western Europeport, Soviet oil and ga. for
-utual benefits. I t
cooperated too it could import Soviet fuels as w.las rare metals. Besides, development of the Sovietenergy sector, the pipeline from West Siberia to WesternEurope, may be the only way of repaying the Soviet bloc'sdebts. [10]
The West can also acquire Soviet technology through
this cooperation. There are some areas, such as welding
technology and high-voltage power lines, where the Soviet
Union is thought to be superior. On the other hand,
there is no economic threat to the West from present and
future Soviet competition. The Soviet Union will not be
able to catch up technologically with the USA through
import of technology. There is nothing dangerous in
export of some technology to the USSR, and the risk that
Moscow will blackmail the USA (after it gets American
technology and the time comes to pay back its debts) is
exaggerated. [11]
According to the proponents of economic cooperation,
the West can derive political benefits from it too. The
trade increases interdependence between the USSR and the
West. Expanded economic ties strengthen detente that in
the long run leads to peace. Through trade we can affect
Soviet policy by giving rewards if its behavior is good
and by punishing it, by withdrawing the reward, if the
behavior becomes aggressive. [12]
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It is also argued that the USA should help theov.e Union because growing prosperity there may
e rise or .ore pluralism, interest gr0 up S
,
and ^liberties, as well as to the relaxation of ideological
control. Technological and managerial skills will
-ore important than ideological purity, revolutionaryfervor will subside as the standard of l iving improves>
and "liberalization" of the system will become
economically functional. On the other hand, a tough
Policy toward Russia will bring about a nationalistic
upswing and cohesion of the Russians vis-a-vis the West
The sanctions against the USSR also damage our ties with
allies. [13]
The opponents of the trade defended their point no
less vigorously. They started with the assumption of
fundamental hostility of Soviet communism toward the
capitalist West. That is why expanded economic ties
could not and cannot strengthen detente and peace. On
the contrary, during the 1970s (the heyday of detente)
the Kremlin undertook an unprecedented military buildup
and continued its expansionist foreign policy. Moscow
undertook all sorts of subversive activities against the
West. What is more, for its military buildup the USSR
widely used that same economic cooperation which was
supposed to promote peace. Many American specialists
pointed to the military application of Western technology
by the Soviet Union. At the same time military
application of the technology may be unclear in the
beginning because in recent years the leading edge of new
technology has increasingly been developed by the private
sector for commercial applications and only later for
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Military ones. As
. consequence, increased commercialcontacts ulth the Soviet Union may result in the ouOf gnif cant techndogiea befone the application ofsimilar technologies to advanced weapon system becomesapparent. [U] 5
The Soviet military buildup can be propped up by theWest indirectly too as a nation's military might depends
ultimately on its economic resources. By f ree iy sellingthe Soviet Union vital equipment and technology theUnited States and its allies are not only helping Moscow
economically but also allowing it to allocate more
resources to its military machine. Meanwhile, the USA
has only limited unilateral leverage in terms of its
ability to control technology transfer to the East. In
the long run it is costly to American taxpayers because
it forces the US government to increase defense
expenditures. On the contrary, if we want peace, we
should be tough. By being tough on trade the United
States can contain the Russian threat to peace. The USSR
is a military giant with economic and national crises.
Therefore tough policy toward it will bring about a
collapse of a dangerous hotbed of war. [15]
Some went further: even if Moscow does not exploit
economic exchanges to enhance its military might, there
is no point in building up the Soviet state into a true
economic superpower by improving its technological base
and managerial techniques; by granting it long-term
credits sometimes tantamount to aid; by facilitating its
capacity to wreck the delicately balanced mechanisms of
interdependence worked out between like-minded
governments in the free world. By modernizing the Soviet
Z'tZ ZuZT create a more vl——
trade nd even can reduce the technological gap betweenthe East and the West. Besides, economic cooperati
.axes Austria! espionage easier for Moscow. [17]
Other seemingly positive points of the trade (UStrade balance, jobs, linking and liberalization of theEast, energy cooperation) are rejected by the opponentsto It too. The trade with the Soviet Union cannot
constantly improve the American balance because the USSR
cannot forever run a deficit with all its trading
partners. A temporary solution to the problem would be
Western credits. But how long can the Eastern debts
mount up? There is a risk of default or Soviet blackmail
of the West after the East gets technology and the time
comes to pay back the debts. These credits are binding
the hands of the West. The latter is becoming "more
sensitive
- perhaps even vulnerable - to the strings
manipulated by the supercorporation known as the Soviet
Union. Moscow may be able to influence even the
government of the United States through the intermediary
of the Chase Manhattan Bank or the many other firms (and
farms) looking for profits in the vast Soviet market".
Thus linking the East to the West turned out into linking
the West to the East. In any event, subsidized export
credits for the Soviet Union are a reward for Moscow at a
time it is engaged in a military buildup. [18]
82
The trade with the Soviet Union provides jobs in theshort run. But later, when the USSR developsProduction in a n^ber of industries (with Western hel
Sh 0%T t0 C0mP6te "1th the West andPus xt off the world markets, using its cheap labor andresources. So in the Ions run if n
unemployment. " " " ^ Cause ^re
Cooperation with Moscow in the energy sector also
cannot ease the world energy situation because of thefundamental hostility of the Kremlin toward the West. Inthe 1960s and 1970s (even having enough oil) the SovietUnion encouraged Arab states to oil embargoes and oil
price raises. This contributed greatly to the price
hikes. On the contrary, suffering energy difficulties
and having to buy expensive oil on world markets the
Soviets will stop such a policy and will press the Arabs
to push the oil prices down.
Besides, as a result of the cooperation with the
Kremlin in the energy sector Western Europe and Japan can
become too dependent on the Soviets. Any energy deal
with the USSR can be used by the latter as an instrument
of political pressure in the Arab manner. Oil can be cut
off at a time of crisis.
Finally, the trade with Moscow helps it to promote
economic development without effecting any significant
reorganization of their system and thus allows it to
avoid liberalization. On the contrary, they may actually
increase authoritarian controls to counteract any
political growth of "bourgeois" tendencies which could be
brought about by the extension of trade contacts with
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Western states. [19]
These are the arguments of the two sides Ananalysis of them reveals th •
nrnn
n ^ e major assumptions of theProponents and opponents of the trade. For the latt!
^ Uni
- -my whic h does not e en ' 0conceal its intention to destroy the West's system (basictenets of Communism). We cannot change it. Therefore
-meaningless to prop it up. For tne formep> ^USSR is not an enemy> In r^ ^ au a ^CltlZm
°
f the Earth
' ^ " give them a helping hand
now it will bring about mutual understanding and peace.
Analyzing the arguments, I concentrate on the mostimportant points: effect of the cooperation on the US
economy, promoting of peace, and US security. As the
arguments of the two sides indicate, the issue of
economic relations with Moscow is ra ther intricate and
far from being one-dimensional. So far neither side has
proved that it was right. The cooperation apparently has
a dubious effect on both countries.
of
not
the
The trade, certainly, improves the trade balance
the United States. However, the Soviet side does
have enough hard currency to make great purchases in
USA and that is why US exports to the Soviet Union are
either insignificant in comparison with the deficit of
the US trade balance or must be financed at the expense
of American credits. In the long run one expects the
credits to be repaid and that will reduce Moscow's
purchasing power. In order to pay for its imports the
Kremlin has increased dramatically its exploration,
extraction, and exports of oil and natural gas. Now
8n
they, not credits, are the „aj„r source of Westerncurrency for the Soviet Union. But stiU the Sovie
experiencing a lack r>f h =^ are
,u„ I
d currenc y and, as it has beenn«
„
the second chapter, the prospects for
uhstant.al increase of Soviet exports are sli m . Thusthe United States can hardly expect a significaimprovement of its trsrt. hoi .
8 nt
bal9nCe
^ ^^^^ ^
imD l"
^ that the
-operation has a positivel PaC
°
n the situati
- of African farmers,
une.ploy.ent, and the world energy crisis by reducingWestern dependency on OPEC. I n spite of Moscow's efforts
so far Soviet-Western trade has been developing mostly
within the framework "machinery, agricultural products
and fuels". So, the fears that injections of Western
technology into the Soviet economy could lead to
substantial increases of Soviet exports of manufactured
products and thus can bring about more unemployment in
the West so far have not been realized.
On the other hand, there are a number of negative
economic effects of the ties. The USSR has significant
difficulties in financing its imports. In addition to
efforts to increase exports of manufactured products it
undertakes great efforts to earn hard currency by
expanding its foreign economic operations - in shipping,
fishing, banking, selling arms to underdeveloped
countries and gold to developed. Still, Western credits
have to be an important financial source of expanding
Soviet imports. The credits have contributed to
inflation in the West by increasing purchasing power of a
country which does not have enough hard currency to buy
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all it can after receiving the credits. They also msv
I;"' J"*-" «•.«,.. hands ana a ioinstrument Tor dipiomatic pressure on ^ ^
Daniel
1
" 1!",' ^ """"^ °" Sov -t-American tradex Yergm pointed out an example of defaulting by aCo».u»l.t North Korea. [ 20 ] Yergin said that "Moscow anever defaulted. But we cannot he sure that tbehavior will last forever".
However, in the history of the Soviet Union there
»ere at least two examples of defaulting: after 1917
when he Soviet government refused to pay back R U£slan
and Provisional government's debts, and after the Second
World War when it refused to return the lend-lease debt.
In 197? an agreement was reached about paying thelend-lease debt through 2001, but the American side
agreed to cut down the amount of the debt (from $10 8
billion to $722 million [21]). In addltion) thls uas
done in exchange for new loans and a trade agreement.
The Soviets paid only $12 million the day the agreement
was signed and nothing more. So, the USSR has refused to
pay back its debts twice. The first debt was rejected by
the Soviet government on the ground that it was taken by
Tsarist and Provisional governments. The second debt was
officially admitted by the Kremlin in the agreement of
1972 and has not been paid.
The most important thing is that the Kremlin uses
the present debt as an instrument of political pressure.
Unless it is granted the regime of MFN Moscow refuses to
pay the lend-lease debt. [22] Another political
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consequence of these credits in the West is rathergnificant:
"Western European officials and bankersthey want to k eep communist regimes political!
econom.cally stable so they can pay back the
-ount. nous debts".
[ 231 In the mid-1 9 80s total Sovietdebt to the West reached $19 billion. However, this did
not cause much concern in the West because the Sovietdebt service ratio (ratio of a debt payment in a certainyear to total hard currency earnings per year) was
relatively small due to the large size of the Soviet
economy and foreign trade operations.
Though by and large the American economy benefits
from the trade with the USSR, there are examples of ithaving had detrimental effects. In the Summer of 1979 13
US chemical companies and farm cooperatives complained
that Soviet ammonia was being sold in the United States
at prices that in some cases were below US ammonia
production costs. More facilities were being closed down
in the industry and production was falling. The Soviet
ammonia plant was built with the help of Occidental
Petroleum Corp. The US International Trade Commission
ruled in October 1979 that the ammonia imports from the
Soviet Union were disrupting the US market. [24]
During the Nixon administration Occidental Petroleum
Corp. signed an agreement about delivering to the Soviet
Union one million tons of superphosphoric acid a year for
20 years. It can lead to the situation by the end of the
century when the store of inexpensive, easily mined
phosphates used for production of fertilizers will almost
be used up. What will remain in the United States will
be either low grade or, as in the vast deposits of the
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C ° Uld
^ates t the mercy of another foreign cartel. At thevery least, the price can be expected to rise. [25However, by and large and apart f r0m a number ofParticular cases economic relations with the Soviet Union
seem to be beneficial for the US economy.
On the other hand, the argument that the economic
cooperation strengthens detente and promotes peace is
rather doubtful. In general historical parallels do not
corroborate such a promotion. Before the World War I and
the World War II trade between future enemies was at the
highest point but it did not prevent the wars. [26]
Apparently other factors are much more important for
strengthening peace than a level of economic cooperation.
One of the major factors is mutual willingness to
compromise and to coexist. The Soviet Union did not show
this willingness. It always, even in the heyday of
detente, refused to abandon its ultimate goal of
destruction of the capitalist system, i.e. it refused to
coexist peacefully.
During detente the USSR did not stop its
anti-Western activity ("support of anti-imperialist
struggle") in propaganda and material and military aid to
all anti-Western movements, including terrorists. The
USA also could be accused of similar actions against
international communism. But the important difference
was that the Soviet activity was aimed at breaking the
status quo in the world while a similar anti-communist
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activity conducted by the United States was ai.ed at».intai„i„ g the status quo
. The Soviet Union triedead communis, Bll over the WOfld ^ ^States (using the same methods as Moscow) tried to stopthe spread of Communism. P
The Soviet Union has always rejected ideologicaldetente, reducing it only to economic and mi i itary
^heres. At the same time any Western attempt toPropagate ideas of freedom and democracy in the Soviet
camp was called "interference into internal affairs ofthe socialist countries". But a logical question is-Why can one interfere in the internal affairs of South
Africa and cannot interfere in the internal affairs ofPoland or the Soviet Union?
Mutual discontinuance of ideological propaganda by
the West and the Soviet Union in practice would mean a
discontinuance of the propaganda by the Soviet Union in
the West. The propaganda of the West in the USSR is
minimal due to the restrictions imposed on Soviet people
be the authorities of the USSR. In other words, the
"ideological war" is going on the territory of the West
but not in the Soviet Union. No wonder that the Kremlin
does not accept ideological detente.
During the 197 0s (the time of intensive economic
cooperation) the USSR was engaged in an unprecedented
military buildup which far exceeded defensive needs and
raised suspicions in the West of offensive intentions of
the Soviet Union. This issue is not a subject of this
work. The point here is only to emphasize doubtfulness
of the thesis that widening economic cooperation promoted
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Peace But this „as a maJ or reason for the USA to turnto the cooperation!
^on^rr J1683" 76 P °lnt ° f -°P-atic„"eS t0 be admi"* d by both advocates andopponents of the tradp i «*
. .
15 the mi litary application ofAmerican technology in th« q • „ .
1070 f u t «.
° Vlet Uni0n
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In November
1979 the nternational Finance Subcommittee of the Senateanking Committee had testimony presented by Commerce
epartment officials on whether the US technology exports
we e centreing significantly to the Soviet Union's
military build-up. Both opponents and advocates of thetrade admitted that they were contributing to thebuildup. Marcuss, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for industry and trade, one of the most ardent proponents
of the cooperation with the USSR, said that yes, they
were used for military purposes by the Soviet Union but
this was known from the beginning and the United States
still should continue the trade. [27]
The military significance can be considered from two
sides: indirect and direct. First, to a great extent
the military might of any nation ultimately depends on
its economic might. That is why by helping the Soviets
to develop their agriculture, transportation, and
industry the United States helps to increase Soviet
economic potential which indirectly makes it easier for
Moscow to increase its military machine. Compensation
projects in non-military areas and selling the Soviets
technology (which would save efforts and time) and even
grains allows the Kremlin to reallocate investments from
non-military sectors into military ones. The same holds
true for the USA, but the centralized non-democratic
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Soviet regime maXes the reallocation of investments into
-Uifry sectors much easier than in the decentralizeddemocratic United States. Besides, there ar
compensation objects built in the USA fcyUmon there are no techno106 ical b re ak
-thro ughs bouby US firms from the USSR, etc.
Second, there are many examples mentioned by USpress, Congress, and government of direct military
application of US technology by the Soviet Union TheSoviet ZIL truck complex built with American aid isproducing not only military trucks but missile launchers
as well. The technology that came with navigation and
electronic orientation devices bought from an American
firm, Litton Industries, is being used to help Soviet
Planes and ships to track American submarines. Other US
electronics for a civilian air-navigation system have
been converted to use in computers for missile guidance.
Precision ball bearings bought from Bryant Grinder Corp.
of Vermont are said to have aided the Soviets in
developing their MIRV missiles. The Kama River truck
Plant built with American help is turning out trucks for
military use, and so on.
In 1978 the White House decided to involve itself in
the process that leads to approval or denial of
technological exports to communist countries. The major
reason for that was that too often the White House got
involved in the licenses when it was almost too late.
One can argue about importance of particular
technology for military purposes, about the fact that
American technology which gets to the Soviet Union often
is obsolete, and so on. But the fact is- US t w ,! being use* by the Soviet side to a v ll'op "
machine which seems to be j ust as Jal
"""any
l arger .
J g00d aE American, and
*™ff*a£l CBergsten and T.Moran, writing on ties of
-»lt nationals with the Soviet Union, added some newpoints to the matter:
..Economic detente win always putthe Un.ted States at a bargaining disadvantage in view ofthe greater i mpa ct of lobbies in Washington than inMoscow". The Soviet
"centralized structure of economic
management enables it to exploit effectively the
competition among American (and others) multinationals"
"Multinational corporations can become hostages to
host-country interests and, if left unsupervised, may act
as ambassadors of host-country rather than home-country
policies." [28]
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a) US Legislation
At the moment of imposing economic sanctions againstthe Soviet Union in , 9 80 President Carter was boun
number of iepiM fl H„ c ^ u U uy a
relevant ^
inter
-«°"al agreements
to the trade with the USSR. These were adoptedor concluded before or during his tenure at the WhHose For tetter understanding of thesituatio
which the President and his cabinet had to carry out theaction it is necessary to give a survey of the most
mportant legislation, especially the Export
Administration Act of 1979.
In 1949 the Export Control Act, and in 1 96 9 the
Export Administration Act, were adopted. Under these
acts limitations were placed upon exports by American
firms. The acts required licenses for exports of some US
technology and goods to Communist countries. Later
receiving the licenses depended on US-Soviet relations
and on the head of the Department of Commerce, who gave
them. Thus, Carter had a relatively free hand in the
field of export of technology.
Nixon's visit to Moscow in 1972 marked the beginning
of expansion of the economic cooperation between the two
countries. Nixon signed the Declaration of Principles,
article 7 of which said that the United States and the
Soviet Union regarded commercial and economic ties as an
important and necessary element in strengthening their
bilateral relations and thus would actively promote the
growth of such ties. Also there was signed the Agreement
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to cooperate in the field* n r „ <
Later fch. >.
llel °s of science and technology.
vi
'
'
!
e" hange haS been a one-way affairw h the Soviet Union importing the African technologybut providing little in return.
n
.gree^nr
0
""!!72 " 6 ^^ 51^ 51
-^ ^ T-deAgre ment with the Soviet Union granting
nondiscriminatory ( B0 .t favored nation . MFN
)
treatment to Soviet goods. It was a trade pact which
-eluded settlement of the Soviet Union's World War II
he
d
ussr T" lend - lea" ^reement required thatt USSR pay by July 1, 2001, a total of $722 million inPrincipal and interest (the Soviet debt was $,0.8
i ion and before the agreement the American side asked$800 million, but even this figure was c ut down ) . [29]Moscow made a first payment of $12 million on October 18(the day the agreement was signed), but then the payments
stopped since the Soviet Union did not get MFN
.
The question of MFN was put before the US Congress
late in 197H when the 1 975 Trade Act was under
consideration (President Ford signed it in January 3,
1975). The trade bill gave the president the authority
to eliminate tariffs of 5% or lower and to reduce by
three-fifth tariffs above 5%. Then on the initiative of
Senator Jackson and Representative Vanik the Congress
adopted the amendment prohibiting normal trade relations
with a communist nation unless the president stipulated,
and the Congress agreed, that the country allowed free
emigration. Thus, with the USSR prohibiting free
emigration it did not receive MFN.
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At the same time the Congress passed the Si-.,
amendment on exoort ,
Stevenson
> ^ •
p credits (on the Export-Import BankAuthorization Bill). ln 1Q7? 1071, »
$169 milimn •
I 9
2
" 1 the Bank had provided
»« lio in credits. The amendment set a $,00ion limit on further credits over the next \ .
n h n J
g PreSldent C ° Uld raiSe lf he *™*it i t e ational interest, subject to a Congressional
-PProva
.
So, the amendment would hring theExport-Import Bank's operation under closer Congressional
supervision
.
The grain agreement with the Soviet Union of 1 975was another important legislation which was inherited byCarter. President Ford concluded the agreement late in
1975 after he had tried to place a temporary curb on
grain sales to the USSR. But in his action he
immediately encountered angry and well organized farm
state protests. Ford hastened to lift that embargo after
only two months and to sign a five-year agreement
(October 1 976 - September 1 98 1 ) . [31]
In August 1975 the State Department disclosed that
the United States was exploring the possibility of
exchanging American grain for Soviet oil. In October
1975, when the White House announced the grain agreement,
it also released a letter of intent, signed that day in
Moscow, to conclude an agreement for the USA to buy up to
200,000 barrels a day of Soviet oil and oil products.
But the oil agreement was never concluded and as a result
President Ford signed an utterly disadvantageous
agreement with the USSR
.
Its disadvantage was determined
by giving a free hand to the Soviet Union in purchasing
American grain and thus introduced uncertainty and
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instability to the US economy.
The agreement committed the USSR to import 6-8 mmtf gram annually. lf the Kremlin wanted to buy moran 8 mmt in any year the pact called Tor consultation!With US representatives before further deals were closedWith Ame rl can firms. Usually every fall the usAgriculture Department announced that the Soviet Unionwould be permitted to purchase much more than 8 mnt ofAmerican grain (in October 1979, for example, it waspermitted to buy up to 25 mmt during the fourth year ofthe agreement, October 1 979 - Septembe r 1 980) . At the
same time the USSR did not have to buy this amount ofgrain and always kept its plans in secret. So, the range
of what the USSR could actually buy was between 6 mmt and
25 mmt. In addition, the purchase of soybeans, rye
oats, and rice was outside the coverage of the agreement
and not counted as part of the minimum or maximum
amounts
.
As it turned out later, the spirit of the agreement
was politically in favor of the Soviet Union too. If
Moscow refused to buy more than 6 mmt of grain this was
considered as an action within the framework of the deal.
But if the USA refused to sell more than 8 mmt (which
also was within the agreement) this was considered as a
political action, a grain embargo, and a move against
detente. The provision of the deal that the Soviets
could buy more than 8 mmt of grain if the US government
approves this actually was interpreted as "the Soviet
Union can buy more than 8 mmt after automatic approval of
this by the American government".
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19K0 the most recent and imoortam-
eg.slative act pertaining to US-Soviet trade
Export dministration Act of 1979 . [32] It Was approyedby the US Congress late in September 1979 and it took
Zt or ^
---- Exp0 rt Administration
The Act states that "exports of goods or technology
wit out regard to whether they may provide a significant
contribution to the military potential" of American
adversaries were detrimental to the national security ofthe United States and thus approved export controls byhe President. [ 33 ] Though it called upon the President
to minimize restrictions on exports of agricultural
products and to use export controls "only after full
consideration of the impact on the economy of the United
States", it still allowed the President to use such
restrictions in three cases: 1)if he determines that the
exports contributed to military potential of a US
adversary; 2)if these restrictions were necessary to
further US foreign policy; and 3)if they were necessary
"to protect the domestic economy from the serious
inflationary impact of foreign demand". [34] So, the
President can restrict exports of any commodity for
national security or foreign policy purposes.
On the other hand, the Act says that the President
should not impose export controls for foreign policy or
national security purposes if the goods were "available
without restrictions from sources outside the United
States in significant quantities and comparable in
quality to those produced in the United States". But it
was the President who waS to determine all theseconditions. [35] n
The Act also says that "the President in everyPossible instance shall consult with the Congress beforei»P03ing any export controls" and it presented six
criteria for export controls application: theProbability that the controls would achieve the intendedforeign policy purpose; compatibility of the controls
with foreign policy objectives; reaction of other
countries; effects of the controls on US export
performance and the competitive position of US companies-
the ability of the United States to enforce the controls
effectively; and foreign policy consequences of not
imposing controls. [ 3 6] This gave the Congress the
opportunity to interfere in the President's action and
was the most important restriction of the President's
freedom of action.
Consequently, the inheritance which Carter got when
he came to the White House bound him only by one definite
obligation: to supply the USSR with 6-8 mmt of grain
annually. He had a free hand in export of technology.
His administration inherited unsettled questions about
lend-lease debt and the MFN regime. The credits to the
Soviet Union depended on Carter and the Congress. A
great deal in American-Soviet relations depended on
Carter but here he did not have a definite or consistent
position. His general attitude toward the Soviet Union
one could define as "detente and human rights": an
incompatible mixture. Carter seemed to understand this
by the end of his presidency. The United States could
pursue a policy of detente toward the USSR but in this
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case it had to forget about human rights there (which the
:Xsii'iitrii
or itcouidr ight f
-
—
^USSR but i„ thi S case it had to reject detente.
b) Development of US-Soviet Trade and US TradePolicy Under the Carter Administration
Economic relations between the USA and the USSRduring the Carter Administration went through a number
stages. After the lac k son-Vani k and Stevenson amendments
were adopted the trade between the two countries
continued to grow. This was a result of long-term
agreements of American firms concluded before the
amendments. The decline of the trade started only in
1977, the first year of the Carter Administration. Inthat year American imports from the Soviet Union slightly
increased but exports plummeted from $2. 3 billion in 1976
to $1.6 billion in 1977. It was the first decline in
US-Soviet trade since 1972. The major reason for that
was a good Soviet grain harvest in 1976 which allowed the
USSR) to cut short its imports of agricultural products.
[37]
It also was the first attempt to force Americans to
repeal the Jackson and Stevenson amendments. The Soviet
Union reduced purchases in the USA and placed more orders
in other countries. In the end of 1976 Brezhnev told
American businessmen that between the end of 197H and the
end of 1976 up to $2 billion in contracts were diverted
to other countries. [38]
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At the same time Moscow was conducting an energeticPropaganda campaign against n AA <
1 •
-i
^6"
"discriminating trad*legislation of the USA" which was f*
diversion of the orders to 1th
° f 8 °Vlet
was partially s f . [[
^e campaign
y uccess ul. the amendments were not
-pealed but
°
UE natl ° nal ^-ests became ,ore popuiar in the
African public and business circles
. NeverthelesSi
1977 the US was the Soviets third largest Western tradingpartner, behind West Germany and Japan.
The trade policy of the USA at this time was built
«P as a resultant of the controversy in the
administration, Congress, and pressure of numerousinterest groups and business.
Within the Administration, the principal exponent of
the usefulness of economic warfare was Zbigniev
Brzezinski, the president's National security adviser
Almost since the start of the Carter Administration he
had argued that withholding of trade from the Soviet
Union and other communist countries would cause them
economic problems and weaken the Soviet Union as a
strategic threat to the United States. He was aided by
former Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger and
sometimes by Department of Defense officials.
On the other hand, a no less powerful faction in the
Administration headed by Secretary of State Vance,
Commerce Secretary Kreps, and Treasure Secretary
Blumenthal spoke out for widening detente and economic
ties with the USSR.
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The Congress, also sh arply divided, was anoth.r
«J.r force arrectins the Presidents decision
.
o "in
any serious attempt to
—
«» .I.::qu . This meant, in thP r^.f
« ,
'
A zne first place, that theAdministration coin h *«4.n ula not count on reDealina f u
'..k..^Hlk amendm ent in the f ae " ' U er Iopposition on the Hill. Pow lul
The Congress was against any attempt to export hightechnology goods to the Soviet Union. In June 1977 65
congressmen signed a letter to President Carter askinghim to bar the sale of an advanced computer system to theSoviet Union. The Congressmen argued that the USSR mightU5e U t0 strengthen itself militarily.
"Soviet
assurances that this computer will be used for peaceful
purposes are unreliable at best, and there is no
practical method of monitoring the uses to which the
computer is put"
- the letter said. The computer was
manufactured by Control Data Corp. It was a "brain
center" of the Pentagon, the Air Force, and the National
Security Council. [39]
In the Administration Brzezinski and other
hard-liners also were against the sale. As a result, the
Commerce Department soon announced that it would' not
grant Control Data an export license to sell its advanced
computer system to the Soviet Union. [MO]
However, this action did not mean Carter's intention
to curtail "technological reward" to the Soviets in
exchange for political concession. In the beginning of
his tenure in the White House he really intended to widen
detente, develop economic and cultural relations with
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This step was made only under fh«a t e pressure of thpongre SS and a part of the Adoration.
"
neXt year (1978) C °ntro! Data announced that ithad received a Department of Commerce license to provide
special computer-based technology to the Soviet Union and
eastern Europe. [ in ]
In July 1977 an agreement between the United States
and the Soviet government was concluded in the field of
science and technology. And in December 1977 the United
States and the Soviet Union extended until 1982 theirfour-year-old agreement on agricultural cooperation. The
agreement provided for three visits of American experts
to the USSR each year to gather data on Soviet harvests.
All this showed Carter's intention to expand
cooperation and to continue selling high technology and
grain to the Soviet Union in larger amounts than fixed by
the trade accord of 1975. In October 1977 the USA
revised the ceiling to permit Moscow to purchase up to 15
mmt of grain during the year October 1977 - September
1978 without first notifying the US Agricultural
Department
.
On the other hand, the policy of the Soviet Union
showed that Soviet leaders were not going to make any
concessions in exchange for the "technological and grain
reward". Early in 197 8 the Cuban intervention on
Ethiopia's behalf in its war against Somalia and also
Vietnam invasion of Cambodia took place. The Kremlin
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stood behind these events.
In February 1978 the US State Department warned thatS Soviet relations would suffer lf Soviet-sponsoredintervention in thp Horn ^-r .of Africa continued. The StateDepartment said: "The chprarf^ ~rn narac ter of our general relations
also depends upon restraint and constructive efforts tohelp resolve local conflicts, not a use of the "economiclever", at least not yet.
Economic relations continued as if nothing hadhappened and the theory of "rewards - punishments" was
not approved as policy. I n March 1978 Dow Chemical
Company signed a ten-year technical cooperation agreement
with the Soviet State Committee for Science and
Technology. The company also increased its exports of
agricultural chemicals to the USSR. A spokesman for Dow
said that the agreement was in accordance with the accord
between the United States and the Soviet government
concluded in July 1977 in the field of science and
technology. [43]
The Kremlin felt comfortable with the US policy of
verbal protests and continued its previous policy
ignoring American hopes of Soviet concessions for the
economic rewards. In the Summer of 1 978 Soviet
dissidents Sharansky and Ginsburg were convicted. This
was a challenge to Carter policy of mixing detente with a
struggle for human rights in the Soviet Union. This time
the President again chose detente. Speaking about the
convictions on a TV news conference Carter said: "I'd
like to have better relations with the Soviet Union and
have expressed displeasure in a very moderate way". This
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"very moderate way" characterized all Cart ,
to the Soviet policy until 1 980 At the nhe rejected tho ^ eWS confe^ncee idea of boycotting the Olympic games inMoscow in 1980 as a «. ' F
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However, a little later the White House decided toforbid the sale of an advanced computer for TASS (Sovietews agency). The decision was made in retaliation fothe sentences gives to Sharansky and Ginzburg. I„
addition, Carter ordered all sales of US oil technology
to be placed under administration review. This meantthat future sales of oil-drilling equipment andtechnology would have to be licensed by the special
nteragency committee. Previously, it was subject onlyto routine Commerce Department clearance. [4 5 ] Exporters
also would have to obtain guarantees from other countries
that neither the equipment nor their products would be
reexported to the Soviet Union. [46]
This first clash of the Carter Administration with
Soviet leaders on the problem of human rights in the USSR
demonstrated an incompatibility of detente and serious
struggle for human rights, incompatibility of the
principle of "nonintervention in the internal affairs" of
the Soviet Union and the possibility of pressing the
Kremlin on the human rights issue.
At the same time another event affecting the US
trade policy took place. That was the arrest of
Crawford. On June 12, 1978, Francis Crawford, a
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representative of International Harvester Co. in Moscowas stopped in his car by Soviet poiice who hauie hiinto he.r vehicle. 2 , hour5 later the us Emb
*
told that he uas being held for „ systematic
large a.oonts of foreign currency to Soviet citizens
speculative prices". [47]
In September 1978 in a Moscow city court he received
a 5-year suspended sentence. State Prosecutor Ilyukhin
recommended a suspended sentence on the grounds that
rawford was a first offender, a stranger to the SovietUnion and a businessman who had helped improveSoviet-American relations. He was allowed to leave theSoviet Union the next day and did so on September 8,
1978. International Harvester, which suspended dealings
with the Soviet Union in July, resumed its sales to the
USSR on September 11. It was widely speculated that his
arrest was in retaliation for the arrest (May 20) in New
Jersey of two Soviet citizens on charges of spying. [48]
Although there is no direct evidence that this incident
affected the US Administration policy, it is clear that
an event like that spoiled general atmosphere of
Soviet-American relations and gave additional argument
against the cooperation with the Soviet Union into the
hands of its opponents.
The events of the summer of 1978 gave a start to
sharp debates in Washington over economic sanctions
against the Soviet Union. As has been said, Carter put
sales of oil-drilling technology under administration
control. Following assessments of Soviet economy which
were reflected in the CIA report of 1977 on economic
prospects of the USSR, the President realized that the
105
Soviet energy sector was one of the critica! 1 , „ ,Moscow and this probacy could be used
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u dus ries of a
-illion plant for manufacturing oil drill bits Thipushed hard-liners in the Adm ini , t r •
to start a
s ation and the Congress
vigorous campaign against the approval.
On August 7, 1978, Senator Jackson wrote a letter toCarter urging him to deny Dresser Industries a licensefor its welding machine or at least to delay thedecision. But on August 9 the Commerce Department
approved it. Brzezinski asked Secretary of CommerceKreps to delay the action but she refused, insisting thatCarter personally had cleared the decision, as had boththe Defense and Energy Departments. Then Schlesinger
who had close personal ties to Jackson and greatinfluence with Carter on strategic matters, sent a strong
memo to Carter, urging reconsideration. Brzezinski
meanwhile, asked Secretary of Defense Brown to take a
second look at the situation. Brown called Dr. Eugene
Fubini, head of the Defense Science Advisory Board, who
turned to Bucy of Texas Instruments to put together a
panel to review the issue. The panel submitted a report
on August 25 that said that the United States should not
export the drill bit technology. The report also said
the computer electronic welding technology should not be
approved for export. [49]
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Th6y »" "at thehad made scant progress in narrowing thetechnological gap between two countries despite thegrowing lnfusion of Western know _ how; trade
USSR helped to reduce the trade deficit; that the WesternEuropeans and Japanese would take
.ore orders fro.American industry; that expanded economic relations
strengthened detente. n the same time the
Administration became a subject of intense pressure from
some parts of American industry for an easing of
restrictions. [50]
This controversy ended up with failure of the
hard-liners. In September 1978 Carter reaffirmed the
sale of sophisticated American oil technology. His
decision ended a heated month-long argument over the plan
by Dresser Industries to sell the plant to the Soviet
Union. [51] At the same time the USSR bought 150
petroleum pipelayers and 112 bulldozers from the
Caterpillar Tractor Co. [52] In October 1978 Control
Data received a Commerce Department license to provide a
computer-based technology to the Soviet Union. This was
done in spite of the fact that in 1 977 the Commerce
Department had announced that it would not grant the
license
.
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All this indicated a definite swin* in ffc
:t:rwr H poiicy toward a—ine rade ith Moscow. However if mas
nr-^c
n , it did not reducepressure on the President. i n October 1Q78
in
government issue a n publlc statementdetsmng the economic consequences" when it blockedexports for foreign policy reasons. Export controls „becoming
"increasingly burdensome" - the business ieaders
to' he s"
1
^
d6ClSi0nS barri " E the £ale of ^P-t-t Soviet Urnon and requiring licenses for the export
of oil equipment. The letter was signed by GeneralMotors Chairman Thomas Murphy, Exxon Corp. President
Kauffman, Chase Manhattan Corp. Chairman David
Rockefeller, and 57 others. [53]
Until the end of 1978, the Administration had
scrupulously avoided any effort to move on the
Jackson-Vanik amendment in the face of powerful
opposition on the Hill. Now administration strategists
thought the time had come to tackle the issue too. But
the Administration had no intention of raising the issue
until it got ratification of a new SALT treaty through
the Senate. Senator Jackson was a principal critic of
the treaty and no one wanted to antagonize him by raising
the sensitive issue of Jackson-Vanik amendment before
ratification. [511]
To improve chances of repeal of the amendment Carter
sent Blumenthal and Kreps to Moscow. About 400 American
businessmen visited Moscow together with them. They met
with Soviet officials on the future of US-Soviet trade.
Both sides spoke for widening trade relations, but
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Brezhnev warned Americans that tradg uould dUS restrictions (includlng the Jac.son-VaniX anStevenson amendments) were not lifted. [ 55]
In 1978, trade between the United States and theoviet Union increased by 50* over the previous yeowever, it did not reach the level which existed ZrZlCarter came to the White House. The increase of 1978 wasin agriculture! exports to the Soviet Union, while
non-agricultural exports showed even a slight decline ofIt. That year US grain exports to the USSR exceeded eventhe pre-Carter level. In 1976 the Soviet Union purchased2«t of grain, in 1 977 - 6 mmt, and in 1978 - , , mmt
.
L 5o J
During these years (1978-1979) US-Soviet trade
developed faster than the average rate if Soviet trade
with developed non-communist countries. As a result, in
1979 the USA took second place after West Germany in
Soviet trade with industrial West. [57] This did not
bring a substantial improvement of the American trade
balance though.
Meanwhile, there appeared new negative sideproducts
of fast development of the trade. In the final days of
1978 67 Congressmen again warned Carter that the Kremlin
used American technology to continue its massive buildup
of strategic and conventional forces.
In August 1978 Armand Hammer, chairman of Occidental
Petroleum Corp., presided over the opening of an ammonia
storage plant near Odessa, the USSR. The plant was a
part of the 20-year, $20 billion fertilizer exchange deal
with the Soviet Union. [58] But already in the summer of
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prices that ln some c3£es were below us
P eduction costs, number of domestic facilities wereclosed down in the industry. The agreement called forOxy to market Soviet ammonia, urea, and potash. Inreturn Oxy got a guaranteed market from Moscow for its
superphosphoric acid. [59]
The United States uses about 17 mt of ammonia
annually. i n 1 97 8
,
ammonia imports ^ ^ ^leaped from practically nothing to 300,000 tons, in 1 979
-
to 800,000. In 1980 they were expected to jump up to
1.2 mt. [60] The US International Trade Commission (ITC)
recommended October 5, 1979, that President Carter impose
a 3-year quota on imports of anhydrous ammonia from the
Soviet Union. The ITC rulled that the imports from the
USSR were disrupting the American market. [61] The
problem was left unsolved until 1 9 80 when actions were
taken as a part of economic sanctions against Moscow.
In the fall of 1979 new testimony was presented
about military application of American technology by the
Soviets. Dr.Vorona, a Pentagon intelligence expert,
testifying before the Senate Procurement Subcommittee in
November 1979, said that the Soviet Union apparently had
used US sophisticated machines to improve the accuracy of
its largest and most deadly nuclear missile. He also
said that an entire series of Soviet computers were based
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of IBM-360 and IBM-370 computers.
At the same time the International Financebcommittee of the Senate Ban klng Committee hetimony presented by Lawrence Brady, De p u ty director ofthe Commerce Department's Office of ExportAdministration. He said thxt M <5 * u ,
'
_
a a us technology exports were
utilized by the military establishment of the USSR and
ley Marcuss, Acting Assistant Secretary of Commercefor industry and trade, speaking for continuation oftechnology exports to the Soviet Union did not deny thatthe Soviets used American technology for military
purposes. [63]
In September 1979 the first Soviet forces
(Sbattalions) entered Afghanistan. They secured the key
airfields of Begram and Kabul. [64] Meanwhile, the
Carter Administration continued "business as usual"
policy. In October federal officials gave permission for
the Soviet Union to buy up to 25 mmt of wheat and corn in
the next year (between October 1, 1979 and September 30
1980). [65]
By and large, Carter's attitude toward trade with
the Soviet Union was more liberal than that of the
Nixon-Ford Administrations. The USA submitted the
majority of exceptions requests to the C0C0M list of
controlled items since the mid-1970s. Starting from 1 977
US exports of computers to the USSR was liberalized too.
[66] At the same time Carter's trade policy toward the
Soviet Union was extremely inconsistent. The President
did not have a definite stance on the issue. His policy
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°\ ° ther hand
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the haggle
- theAdministration brought about the resignation of several
advocates of expanding cooperation with the USSRCommerce Secretary Kreps, Treasure Secretary Blumenthal
Secretary of State Vance, Deputy Assistant Secretary ofCommerce for Trade Regulation Marcuss left the
Administration at different times for different reasons.
The Commerce Department was reorganized. This was the
triumph of the view held by the National Security Council
that trade with the Soviet Union could be used as a
political weapon. [67] However, as further events
demonstrated, this policy also failed to change Soviet
behav iour
.
When US Ambassador to the USSR, Thomas Watson,
expressed concern early in December 1979, to Andrei
Gromyko about reports of Soviet troop movements on the
Afghanistan border the Soviet Foreign Minister stated:
"The reports are wrong. We don't know what you're
talking about". [68] Nevertheless, on December 17 (a
week before the main forces invaded), Soviet airborne
troops entered Afghanistan. [69] Sometime after
mid-December, when the Soviet buildup on the Afghan
border was evident, the White House raised the idea of a
grain embargo with Secretary of Agriculture Bergland and
Under Secretary Hathaway. This indicated that the
that the Soviet Intervention was a total surprise for it.
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CHAPTER iv
COLLISION
1 .toO** Lnl^ej^ ^ A££tl^i^
The Soviet takeover of Afghanistan was „
unexpected action Tf sudden
srr
-r- "----r-;::-::
+ 11 •
n Af8hanistan. ThpSoviet Union supplied the «
assistpno . ^
country with militarya ce and weannnc; = «, i JP° ns as well as economic aid. With i-h-overthrow of Daoud in 1Q7ft r
the
978
'
four times as many Soviet
1E no evidence of direct Sovietinvolvement in the 1 978 coup, lt is clear that Daou(j , spes - 76 tm toward the West disturbed the Swut;-that they supported the coup once it was accompl ished
. [ ,
]
After the coup of April 1978 when Taraki came topower, Moscow suggested to him that he insure his regime
against counter-revolution by entering, in December 1978into the kind of defence treaty which had enabled the
Soviet Union to secure unpopular regimes by military
force elsewhere. [2] Meanwhile, the scale of popular
struggle against the regime was constantly increasing.
In March 1979 Amin replaced Taraki as Prime Minister but
Taraki remained titular head of the state. However,
Amin-s extremely cruel regime could not cope with mass
resistance either. The uprisings spread all over the
country. In the summer of 1979 the Soviets had an option
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either to lose a frienrilv ™i end y communist reeimp ™ 4-u •border or to intervene. [3]
° n their
In September 1 Q7 Q fua ^.
battalions) entered I ' ,\ ^Afghanistan. On December 17 1070seven Airborne divisions (a division equals • '
of 3 battalions each containing 4-5 hun e /
egl » ent8
certain positions in Afghanist n. ^
-ainea paid and equipped troop£ J'^Z^^The Amborne divisions do not come under anv .but answer directly to the Poll b r
December the main army invaded ^
In th
*
e " d
°
f
. .
y l . On December 27 1070Amin was ousted, executed, and replaced bv r„ n
Premier Karmal. By the en of D k
^
trooos h*H
ecember,
1 979, the Soviet
L:;:;ys
"d
ur
cupied ai1
— -n. airfields
, and
By this action the Kremlin made a new precedent-from now on the Soviet Union could intervene overtly notonly into any country of the socialist camp in order toprevent its transition from the Soviet to Western sphere(as, for example, in Czechoslovakia in 1Q68) but also it
could invade a Third World country which had been in the
Soviet sphere of influence. Thus, the Brezhnev doctrine
"you do not abandon a communist regime" was expanded to
the Third World countries which proclaimed the "building
of socialism" or at least to peripheral countries deemed
vital to Soviet security. By this act the Soviets wanted
to make certain that any territory which at any time has
come under communist rule remains so. But at the same
time Moscow reserved the right for itself to undermine
any pro-Western regime (to support "anti-imperialist wars
of liberation"). In other words, the Soviet stance meant
12H
that whatever changes occurred in the world , a „afreet on ly the holdings of the Western Z £
2
-lli£ Sanctions af 19M
On December 28, i 979f President Carter said thata result of the Soviet push into *e ,
" S
or d •
P 0 Af 6 h anistan his opinionBu..i.„, had changed
.ore drastically during on „
/
Urlng the «"•**«>« ^o and a half years [ 6] hSov.et invasion apparently was unexpected to h im .
was no contingency panning on this occasion. Thesanctions were devised between the invasion and Carter'sJanuary , 1 980
, speech
. [?]
aye and later was elaborated over the course
several months.
. , .
X
\ W ° Uld be Wr°^ t0 **y that the CarterAdministration did nothing in response to the Sovietgradual takeover of Afghanistan before 1 9 80 its
response was covert actions against Soviet covert
actions. But the popular resistance to socialist
experiments which were accompanied by extreme cruelty
apparently was the foundation of the uprisings in
Afghanistan. Unwilling to spoil detente Carter paid
little attention, at least openly, to the Soviet
takeover. He did not warn Moscow against possible
intervention in Afghanistan as Moscow warned the West
against possible intervention in Iran. [8] At the same
time American concern about Soviet military activity on
the Afghan border expressed by US Ambassador Watson early
in December 1979 and the discussion of a possible grain
embargo in case of Soviet invasion with Secretary of
Agriculture in late December indicate that the President
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had Information on the
invasion. ^ P reP»"tion for the
Confronted with the Soviet action Carter ha,number of options. i n the bM „, H , "
d a
— - — -bo \ r ng sa r r; rs tr
t:z
5Tion had three - •*political, and economic actions. [9] ^'
"Rules of the game" restrain a
. . „
*
Ine American and Soviet
c Tth r T 6 th6ir mUltary againea h other. So, lf the Soviet Unlon lntervene(jAfghani an the United States could not use its militaryforces there against Russians. It was possibie, howeverto use military forces of American proxies (Pakistan orothers This could cause, though, Soviet intervention
in Pakistan. Another possibility was to provide Afghanguerrillas with American weapons, including missiles (asthe Soviets provided Vietnamese guerrillas). Thisprovision could be done through US proxies. But the
military option was ruled out because Carter was against
it.
The political option referred to US efforts in the
UN
- condemnation of the Soviet Union by the General
Assembly and mobilizing world public opinion against the
Soviet action. This was the least dangerous in terms of
disrupting international stability but at the same time
the least effective and the most dangerous for Carter
politically as he had already gained the reputation of a
weak president.
Under these circumstances, the economic option wasthe most attractive and feasibie for him I h
-s put on a grain embargo. Here the ric ' Z^Twas the strongest Th* ne. an Position"s &1, ine USA supplies Un* ft f ^ii j ,
traded internationally 751 „, !
1 the Wheat
exports and UN resolution would cause the Soviet
withdraw from Afghanistan. [11]
On January 4
,
1980, Carter announced a sharp
curtailment of US grain sales to the Soviet Union andother measures in retaliation for the Soviet invasion,ihe measures announced were:
D17 mmt of grain ordered by Moscow were not to bedelivered. Exempt were 8 mmt the United States delivered
in 1980 under the terms of the 197 5 grain agreement.
Regulations requiring validated licenses for the exports
of agricultural commodities to the Soviet Union went into
effect on January 7, 1980. By this date about 5.5 mmt of
grain had either been shipped or loaded in preparation
for export, leaving some 2.5 mmt to bring total exports
up to the 8 mmt. [ 1 2]
2)The sales of high technology equipment were
suspended until further notice. Among the items were
advanced computers and oil-drilling equipment. There
were two types of licenses for high technology
commodities: validated
- for more sophisticated
technology, and general - for less sophisticated. On
January 4, Carter did not ban exports of less advanced
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licenses ranged from BB
""^
1 975 . 1979 .!
$258 milllon to $ 183 million ln
1 979. As a result of the sanctions they wereexpected to drop to around *t;n „•„ , „
.,„„
$50 million in 1980 instead of$200 mllllon as predicted before
_ ^ e
-non). n 3;V e
58
;::;;'; 9"^-
<- ho » '
Larter formally directedthe Secretary of Commerce KiutznicK to begin a review ofUS policy on exports of high technology to the USSR andto suspend the issuance of new validated lioenses untilthe review was completed. The next day he instructed
Klutznick to suspend previously issued validated license,
and to bar their shipments, again, pending completion ofthe review. [14]
3)Soviet fishing privileges in American waters were
curtailed, depriving the Soviet Union of 350,000 tons of
fish in 1980. On January 8, 1 9 80, the United States
restricted the Soviet allocation for catches within the
US 200 mile Fishing Conservation Zone from a possible
432,000 tons to 75,000 tons. This was not a violation of
the 1976 Fishing agreement with the USSR. The permit to
catch 75,000 tons of fish in 1980 had been issued already
and Soviet fishing vessels had begun operations off
Alaska. The Administration decided not to reduce this
catch. Thus, the Administration's handling of the
restrictions on Soviet fishing rights was similar to its
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approach to grain exports in which the basic 3ewas not scuttle n.u agreement
reduced. ulT ^ ^ «•
")The opening of new American and So»1»tfacilities were delay ed indefinitely a d w ZZ
Z
and economic exchanges wene deferred. By ti sMinistration curtailed the scientific Ld ch glc
"
::r
.e Prog established^ eleven agreements
™
cooperation in the"!i wlng ^Z^lTl 7^
. .
B iieias. the environment
e xcino and public health> •
echnology, agriculture, oceanography, energytransportation, atomic energy, artificial heart research
and housing and construction. As a result of the
sanctions, activities within the framework of the
agreements were three times less than in 1979. [16]
5)Boycott of the 1 980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.
Actually, the final decision to boycott the Summer
Olympic games came later. On January t
, 1980, Carter
only warned that the United States might not participate.
On January 20, in a TV appearance he set a one-month
deadline for the Soviet Union to withdraw from
Afghanistan. Only after the deadline, on February 20,
was the boycott decision taken. On the other hand,'
according to the Olympic Charter, it was not the US
government but the US Olympic Committee who could take
the boycott decision. The House of Delegates of the US
Olympic Committee voted for the boycott only in April
1980. [171
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Policy of dete t T the previous
Senate to d^, w^SiT 198 °' ^ " e
t *
^definitely consideration of the SAI T ttTreaty and recallpri nc a„u j e 5 L1 11
Persian Gulf t
P an tt.ek on theo . ln addltiorii thg £o lntervention
accelerated the nsrw
i
„. „ ,
US-Chinese accommodation whichticularly irritated the Kremlin. On January 6,Defense Secretary Brown visiting Peking, a i ed To'r
-Plementary actions" hetween the United StateChina to counter Soviet expansion. [18]
Thus, together with political measures, PresidentCarter decided to apply the economic weapon in responseotne USSR's expansion. But the weapon was used onlyhalf-way. While the Soviet leaders were breaking all
norms and agreements having occupied an independent and
weak country, Carter decided to fulfill all contractual
obligations. In September 1980, the Bulletin of the US
Department of State said that the administration had
deliberately avoided sweeping measures such as a total
trade embargo. "We wish to leave the door open for
rebuilding our economic relations if the Soviet Union
withdraws from Afghanistan"
- said the Bulletin. The
explanation for the Administration's response was rather
unconvincing since when declaring the sanctions, Carter
said that he did not expect the Soviet Union to withdraw
from Afghanistan. What was the point of "leaving the
door open" if it was clear from the beginning that the
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;.r:;;i;
embargo? r a total trad e
a b0Ut
In
":
s:;::r:;
American response nothi
-
»
deliveries to* , ^—"ural and technologicalCneS 0 the Soviet satellites. Trade with Eastern
-Pe „ent on. There was only a warning not toS e ports to the Soviet Union. But some ohservers „keptical about Eastern Europe's willingness or aoi tyto insure that no diversion of embargoed US technology orgram occurred. Warsaw Pact countries were planning
priortothee.hargo.toi.portahoutU^tof^rain
in
980 In the months following the embargo, that importtotal grew to more than 18 mmt, despite the year-s vastlyimproved East European harvest prospects.
C 19] On the
other hand, Carter Administration officials insisted thatthe leakage was "minimal" or "modest". [20] Still there
remained the question of whether CMEA countries were, in
fact, separable from the Soviet Union.
The measures did not envisage cessation of
scientific and cultural exchanges with the USSR. It was
said that only new exchanges were deferred. Meanwhile,
there were numerous indications of the i nadequa teness of
such exchanges. In spite of the fact that official
actions were not taken, by the Summer of 1980 scientific
exchanges dropped by 80*. Student exchanges
continued .[21]
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bad" ne^r^n:::::;:
6 minimai but they »'•—
These measures were considered as temporary from thebeginning. Cessation of the sal*, k .
them was discussed Ai
SUSP^ io » «>'. ll sanctions reflected th„
Administration's willingness to prese DaereerapnU uU h «-u t, rve previousg ments with the Kremlin and to keep open the optionfor restoring activity to a higher level if the poli
situation improved. 1
article! ""M"^ ° f ^ n",rked b *
lo \ American press: the sanctions must beng we should not repeat 1968 when after several monthsafter the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the West
resumed normal relations with the USSB. m uni£on
, inthe ^id-January 1980, Carter declared that normal trade
would not soon be resumed with the Soviet Union. [22] InSeptember 1980 the Bulletin of the US Department of State
said the grain embargo would continue as long as the
Soviet Union continued its aggression against
Afghanistan. However, Carter later began to soften
gradually the position taken in January 1980.
Before examining further American policy two
questions should be answered: why did Carter react to
the Soviet action this way? and what were the aims of
the sanctions? The reasons for the President's reaction
to the Soviet intervention can be considered from three
points of view: Daction of the President as a rational
actor; 2)action a a result of political pressures on the
President; and 3)action as a result of personal stress.
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From the first point of view Carter.*
the Soviet invasion, if not r 1 ^
Pattern for future Third J£ \'
r^ *^ «
the economic sanctions. [23] Carter al,
^
the Soviet invasion of Af
afraid that
of a f
ehamstan was only the beginninggreater invasion of the Middip r *-ne le East and taking
h
°
0
n r of the Middle »«t on. Thls could pu
:l;
3
-! r r ear hoiocaust - •-"«!.«. b , f :tne West. I n his Address to the Nation in i
1Qftn n
n m January 4,1980, the President said that h b <
.
0<SAU Ln the invasion was "astepping-stone to possible controlH i ° over much of theworld's oil supplies".
In addition, the Soviets broke the rules of theEame: they used their forces directly in a neutral
sphere and demonstrated an extraordinary cynicism. Such
a policy had to be met by decisive measures. The mostdecisive (short of war) were broad economic sanctions
even if the President did not believe in their
effectiveness.
At the same time, Carter had been under constant
political pressure on the part of hardliners in his
Administration and the Congress even before the Soviet
intervention. In order to preserve detente he tried hard
to react softly to previous Soviet actions, including
gradual takeover of Afghanistan. But the negative
feedback the policy had received before the intervention
gradually built up and the decisive Soviet action became
a pretext for abandoning it.
In previous years Carter had earned th.of a weak president M u reputation
decisiveness. It Z the T 7^" t0 d~trate his
to aot
.eoisivei d in
Sm
:h
a
To ^
the oountry, the Congress an/ I * ^
created a crisis situ k
W ° rld
'
Cart erbl ation by plavine nn tu
of the Soviet action u
P he S1 8"flcance
greatest f h \ t 6 Called the intervention "thet reat to peace since the World War II" ,Being the leader of
. popular stance against thl ,
-ion could improve his politica! posiUo "\ rTillpresidential elections.
the Soviet Tr
" hen W ° rking
°
Ut the r <S*°«*' to
t so, ,
"° n Under e tryingo ve other impQrtant probiems;
g
-nation, une.ploy.ent, the energy crisis, 1 w i fopularity before the presidential election;, etc Allthree points of view taken together can glve an
explanation of why the President reacted to the Sovietinvasion this way.
Economic sanctions have been widely used i„international relations for political purposes. Usually
they aim at making a country change its policy by
punishing it economically for adversary action(aggression against another country, persecution of
opposition, support of a hostile nation like in the case
of the Arab oil embargoes, etc.). When the wide economic
cooperation with the Soviet Union was just starting, the
possibility to affect Moscow's policy by giving it
rewards or punishing it economically was one of the
decisive factors which convinced the American government
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to promote the trade.
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ange in overall trade policy. l n time they stop
sanctions and become a new economic policy.
The American economic sanctions against the Sovieton in 080 were neither of the first nor the secondtype. Often members of the Carter Administration
underlined that the sanctions were not intended to
reflect a change in overall US trade policy. [25]
Some members of the Administration suggested thatthe aim of the sanctions of 1980 was to induce a change
of Soviet policy, namely a Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Deane Hinton, Assistant Secretary for
Economic and Business Affairs of the Department of State
for example, said that the purpose of the sanctions was
to impose a heavy price on Soviet aggression in order to
hasten Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and to deter
similar actions elsewhere. That is why the
Administration intended that the sanctions would remain
in force until Soviet troops were fully withdrawn. [26]
Contradictorily to this Carter said that he did not
believe the sanctions would cause the Soviet Union to
withdraw from Afghanistan. [27] The grain embargo was
not expected to induce a Soviet withdrawal, but was
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intended to inflict damage on the Soviet feed gra inlivestock cohidIpv r * am -
improvement in their diet. [28]
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eXPreSSlng Wri0an diS "^action «ito xe aggress 10n in a situation when it was not
-hie to change Soviet policy. The sanctions erear s.gnal of the importance attached by the UnitedStates to the Soviet action. They were also intended tomake the Soviet Union pay a price for the aggression sothat to deter it from further actions of this Kind. Atthe same time, the US Administration took care not to
abrogate the formal agreements with the Soviet Union, not
to destroy the framework of East-West relations. [29)The question of how high the price for the aggression was
and to what extent the Soviets were deterred from further
actions will be considered in the parts on economic and
political effects of the sanctions. The point to be made
here is that initially the American side considered
economic cooperation as a lever which could be applied in
order to manipulate Soviet policy. But when the time for
the application came, the US Administration did not find
itself in the position to change the Kremlin's policy and
the goal of the sanctions was much more moderate and
vague
.
The idea of the economic sanctions and particularly
the grain embargo gained support in the USA in early
1980. On January 6, The New York Times wrote that "in
nonfarm states the measures are 'presumed to be popular".
The farmers backed Carter on the embargo too. The
Congressmen f rom fartners ,
constituency on the h POlled thel r
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t o i ort from Maine to Texa<sPuerto Rico An f h< „ .v, and lnh0W6d suPP°rt which was Riven toe sanctions and the win of c„Mon peopie to
opted course even more decisively than it was hedone by the Carter Administration.
At the same time, Carter, experiencing pressure fromoppose forces in the Administration, was afraid o
Tod
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:rr
ly hard measures
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Th <
stood up to criticism of the position of theInternational Longshoremen's Association. SoonLongshoremen, responding to a federal court order, loaded
*».rle.„ grain on a vessel headed for the Soviet Union.
[31] The grain involved was not covered by the sanctions.
In preceding years as well as in 1 9 80 the Carter
Administration was split between advocates and opponents
of wide economic cooperation with the USSR. After the
occupation of Afghanistan, a number of advocates of trade
were replaced by persons who stood for "punishment" of
Moscow. They considered the sanctions as temporary
measures, believing that after an appropriate punishment
a gradual restoration of previous relations would take
place. Such a punishment would prevent the Kremlin in
the future from resorting to the policy of expansionism.
Carter held about the same stance. This was shown by his
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measure Secretary Blumenthal wasrep aced by wnila. Hiller. Secretary of State Vanaid of January
, 2> are not planning at this pel
e any other measures fagainst the Soviet Unio pt32] But in May 1980, he also resigned and was replacedby another advocate of
-punishment"
, Muskie. On thegrain embargo Muskie said: "That ls a t
toward the Soviet Union. It may not deter them or causethem t0 reverse their course> fcut go . ng ^ ^
with an impact, L. sure, on their future policies".
So, after Afghanistan a transformation took place in
the policy of the Carter Administration toward the USSR
not from detente to a breaking off, but from detente to
"punishment", that is to say to a temporary suspension of
detente.
Besides this main line of the new policy of the
Carter Administration two others took place. On the one
hand, advocates of breaking off economic relations with
the USSR (Brzezinski, Warren Christopher, Deputy
Secretary of State, officials of the Defense Department)
argued that the United States should try to deny the
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Soviets not only items of potential
also anything 1-haf •, y value but^n th t could significantly improve Sov^feconomic efficiency and growth.
On the other hand, the advocates of th.
"business as usual" r e P°lic ydi (some officials fv>- c<-
Commerce Den a r^ otl f >
I at the State andw"inic t.e d p rtments) were aeain<?i- tu„
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&ainst the economic mpa^i^^c.Pointing out the damage which the USA wool 8U ^te possibility f0P the Soviet Union to buy
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o her countries. Gradually, th , ^ *
ronger and the advocates of "p u „lshraentn began Jfor the pol lcy
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lnterlaci^ of different biases.In 1980 about 30 bills and resolutions on questions
relatmg to US-Soviet economic relations were offered inthe Congress, let alone the numerous debates and
speeches. Generalizing this material one can distinguish
the following trends in the Congress.
For rescinding the grain embargo.
For the sanctions but at the same time for rendering
more assistance to American farmers.
For the grain embargo and other sanctions against
the USSR.
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For different measures aimed at making the „restrictions more effective. trade
which^did^not"
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—triesich id t cooperate with the USA in its att™„ t
affect Soviet policy. temp to
For a total trade embargo and abandoning detente.
Union'
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Danning eXP ° rtS
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f fertili"- ^ the Soviet
For banning import of Soviet industrial goods.
For cessation of scientific exchanges with theSoviet Union.
Some congressmen supported several initiatives.
Such a pluralism of responses reflected different and
often contradictory interests of certain areas and
sectors of American population.
The debates over the grain embargo began right after
it was imposed. As one could expect, they were initiated
by representatives of farm states. In January 1980
Congressman Leach (Iowa) offered a resolution
(H. Con. Res. 237) dissaproving the decision to embargo
grain sales to the USSB. Senator Dole (Kansas) also was
against the embargo from the beginning. Later he was a
leader in attempts to achieve its lifting.
However, the Congress as a whole supported the idea
of economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The
farmers in the beginning supported the measures too.
Many of their representatives in the Congress did not
speak against the sanctions. In the beginning they just
mo
sought to make the measures less harmful for th. rThey put forward certain proposals (loa s t a
;r-
d
— -hment of land ^ve
'^gram, purchase and distribution of food to as"other nations, etc ) sist
,*
^c.,. The congressmen from theagricultural states offered t« u-u
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ner to prohibit exports offertilizers to the Soviet Union because it .
for farmers as it led to I I
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production cost for the farmers.
An active struggle against the grain embargo began» June 19 80, after USBA gave us grain £erm
;
S
r ° 3611 origin grain to theSovxet Union. Department of Agriculture notified CargillGram Co. that the Administration was lifting its
request that US companies keep their foreign affiliatesfrom trading grain to the Soviet Union. [3*] This flared
up emotions at the Hill 9 nH i ^ «.16 n i and le d to introduction of
several bills demanding the embargo be lifted.
On the 20th of June, 1980, Senator Dole offered a
bill (S2855) to rescind the agricultural commodity export
embargo to the Soviet Union. The same day two similar
bills were submitted in the House of Representatives
(H.R.7635
- Harkin from Iowa and H.R.7632 - by Abdnor
from S.Dakota). Thus, the Administration's gradual and
silent cancellation of the stated program led to the
demands for its immediate and complete cancellation.
However, at that time the opponents of the embargo
did not have a majority in the Congress. Undoubtedly,
they influenced the decisions of the Administration but
m
failed to achieve the rescinding cf the embargo, m the
~ of 9 80, a tad harvest in the world became knownThe opportunity to increase exports of grain to othercountries appeared. A trade grain agreement with China
was concluded. All this suspended the hot debates in theCongress
.
The position of the Congress in 1 9 80 on the issue
allows these conclusions: The majority of the Congress
was in favor of the sanctions against the USSR and the
Congress was more decisive on the issue than than the
Carter Administration.
The Congress opposed the grain embargo but not other
elements of the program of January 4. The opposition to
the grain embargo was not for the sake of saving detente
(which many in the country and the Administration
favored) but for improving the situation of the farmers.
Carter could have received the support of the Congress if
he had made greater steps to improve the farmers'
situation at the expense of tax-payers. In this case he
could even have increased sanctions against the USSR.
The measures against the Soviet Union in 1980 were
the continuation of the struggle on the issue in the
Administration and the Congress as well as all over the
country. In their turn the measures caused new debates.
Hundreds of articles and statements reflecting different
positions have been published. Leading the campaign for
tough licensing rules against the Soviet Union was
organized labor. [35]
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ta.n.ng each of the US industrial all les , cooperatiin carry.ng out these sanctions, US efforts would net besuccessful. [37 ] When in the Spring of 19 80, it became
obviou. that the allies did not follow the USA but, onthe contrary, took advantage of the situation, the
critic S1
» of the sanctions in the United States increased
too. Since the measures were considered as provisional
the firms selling technology were worrying that in thefuture it would be difficult to restore normal relations
with the Soviet Union. [38]
Thus, the indecisiveness of Carter who considered
the sanctions not as a transition to a new policy but as
temporary "punishment" contributed to instability in
American business because his policies were hurting the
country's economy.
The American companies leading in Soviet business
were the most resolute opponents of the sanctions. Among
these companies was Occidental Petroleum which exchanged
amend^t ,hough the ame
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maln qUeSU0nE Were the Object of hot debateshe Administration in 19 80: „ th . policy in thesphere of high technology sales to the Soviet Union,2)export of American phosphates and import of Soviet
ammonia, 3)export of oil drnn««n a ming equipment andtechnology
.
In the high technology sphere the US government, on
January 9, suspended all exports of sophisticated
technology and machinery to the Soviet Union. The action
suspended all existed licenses and froze all shipments
under contracts. The suspension was to remain in effect
from 4 to 6 weeks, pending the administration review of
its overall policy on exports to the USSR. [40]
On January 11, the Commerce Department announced
that it had refused to issue export licenses to the USSR.
It included computing systems, seismic data processing
equipment, etc. [41]
On January 21
, the Commerce Department
licenses fon exporting spare computer parts toll t
""ion. The parts had teen desti ed f or the Karr^ 7true, Plan t whlch was accused of manu ct ng okTZthe Soviet army. [2j 2 ] truc s for
In order to reduce the leakacp „r <-u
used by the USSR for mlI ta / teChn °l0gy
Deoartm^nt h
ili ry purposes the Commerce
tech ^
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" Of illegal sales ofnology to Moscow since ,978. It turned out that in
urn ber of oases US manufacturers had
v o at export controls ^ ^^^^ J
-11 tari y Slg„lficant
. The g0Qds were ^
Soviet Union through dummy companies in other countries
or were sent out of the United States without the
required licenses. [„] In other cases the Soviets usedlegally bought American technology for military purposes.
^ a result of the investigation Carter came to the
conclusion that the best real „ay to preclude Soviet
usage of American technology for military purposes wasimposing an embargo on sales of any Kind of high
technology equipment to the Soviet Union regardless ofits intended purpose. Such a step was made by the
Administration as a temporary measure.
In March 1980, the results of a review of new policy
on high technology exports became known (on January 9
there was only a suspension of exports until the new
policy would be accepted). On March 18 the Commerce
Department announced that it would tighten controls on
American exports of high technology products, a move that
ended weeks of intense debate within the Administration.
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" By that day Carter suspended about 700 . .licenses that allowed American companies
equipment to the Soviet Union. [,6]
Another question related t- ^ 4-u
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.5 m llion tons annually for the period ,98.,[«7] In exohange the United States delivered to the USSPhosphates which »a , th„ k- R
to the USSR r .
gg6£t non - cr °P "em exported10 n from America. [i»8]
According to the USDA, the .nil <
*
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-arl ma ration. Since the growing season is short inmany areas of Russia, the use of phosphatic fertilizers
was important. [,« with extensive US financial support,
-eluding Export-Import BanX loans, American phosphate!had become the basis of the fertilizer industry in theSoviet Union. In 1979 American exports of phosphates toRussia totaled $97 million, in 1 9 80, it had been
projected at $100 million. Short-run impact of a
Phosphate embargo against the Soviet Union could be
minimal but the longer-run impact on Soviet fertilizer
production could become severe. [50]
The issue had been hotly debated in the Carter
Administration for two months after the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. Brzezinski and Agriculture Secretary
Bergland wanted a complete ban on fertilizer trade with
Moscow. Officials at the State, Commerce, and Treasure
Departments and Oxi were against the ban. They had
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contended that the ban would cause m0 re harn, to the
cou d find trading partners elsewhere. [51] Besides, theovies could refuse to repay the credits extended bExport-I.port Bank and private banks in 197, fo/project. [52] r the
On the other hand, US production of the
superphosphoric acid accounted for about 90. of world
capacity. The Soviet Union would not be able to replace
much of the acid embargoed by the United States [53]According to the General Accounting Office, there was aprobability that the deposits of phosphates in the USA
could become exhausted. [ 5 4] These factors pushed Carterto impose trade restrictions.
As far back as December 1 1, 1 97 9 , Carter refused toimpose trade restrictions on imports of anhydrous ammonia
from the USSR. He rejected a recommendation by the US
International Trade Commission that quotas be imposed on
the Soviet imports because they were causing injury to
American ammonia producers. [55] But on January 18,
1980, Carter imposed the recommended quotas, reversing
the decision of Decembe r 1 1 . The one year limit was to
restrict imports to one million tons. In 1979 the United
States bought 0.9 mt of ammonia. The import total for
1980 had been expected to reach 1.2-1.4 million tons. [56]
On January 11, 1 980, a high-level working committee
at Carter's request was called up to decide the question
of phosphate exports to Moscow. But the decision was not
taken. [57]
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e ummer of 1980, he was considering asking for its ohird-party arrangement to snip phosphates from TunisMorocco, and Mexico to the Soviet Union. [60]
The next question debated in the Administration wasthe export to the USSR of oil-drilling equipment andtechnology. Soviet oil production was expected to begindeclining in the 1980s because of inefficient
exploitation. Brzezinski and other hard-liners in thegovernment wanted to ban the sale of any oil-drilling
equipment. Some aides, however, had asked if it was in
the American interest to limit Moscow's ability to
modernize its oil industry. [61] The State Department
warned about future confrontations in the Persian Gulf
and urged sale of equipment to help the Soviets increase
domestic output. Finally, under a compromise, the
decision was made to ban the sale of oil-drilling
technology but not oil-drilling equipment itself.
Knowing about the leakage of the American technology
which Moscow used for military purposes it is difficult
to imagine that Carter really believed in the possibility
of preventing leakage of oil-drilling technology and at
U8
the same time continuing sales of oil-drilli B . •1 a l l ng equipment.
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- 0' the free world to theSoviet aggression was extremely negative. In BrusselS)
Executive Commission of the European Community oJanuary 7, 1980 suspended export subsidies and thegranting of licenses for grain and dairy products to theSoviet Union. The Canadian External Affairs Minister
"id her country would not compensate the Soviet Unionfor any shortfall in its grain suPpli es resulting fromthe US embargo and, on January 1 1 , Canada declared a
cutoff of trade credits to the USSR and a halt to high
technology exports. Australia, on January 9, also said
it would not meet any shortfalls in Soviet imports from
Australia's wheat stocks. [62]
At a January 12, 1 980 conference of grain exporters
held in Washington representatives of Canada, Australia,
the EEC, and Argentina approved a statement that "there
is general agreement among the export representatives....
that their governments would not directly or indirectly
replace the grain that would have been shipped to the
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not specked. However, Argentina declined tocooperate folly ln the embargo. [65]
In the field of high technology, unilateral American7 SanCtl ° nS C ° Uld haVe Ema11 as US sales ofhigh technology products to the USSR „ere rather small
and a lot could be replaced by other countries. That is
why the Carter Administration undertook a number of
efforts in order to achieve an agreement to grant no
exceptions for the Soviet Union to the Coordinating
Committee's (COCOM) list of exports that were banned to
Communist countries. [66]
The Carter Administration also wanted to win allied
agreement to expand the COCOM list to cover a much wider
range of computers and software, oil and gas field
equipment, steel mill equipment, communications
equipment, advanced machine tools, chemical plants, and
automatic production technology. The United States also
was asking for a total cutoff of official credits to the
USSR, a joint grain embargo, and an end to subsidized
sales of butter, meat, and sugar by the EEC to the Soviet
Union. [67]
However, the US allies hsh
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In this situation the aUles wepe Hiuilittle more than take token economic measures coupled
t I 7T Pr ° teStS - 10 F6brUary 1 980 ' " - dearhat West Germany (leading Soviet trade partner of theW
) would continue its Soviet trade hecause mostcontracts were long-term and it was very difficult to cutthe. off. [71 ] In March 198Q Chancellor Schm . dt sa . dthat it was difficult for West Germany to join in the UStrade embargo against the USSR. [72] West Germany was
more involved in East-West trade than other Western
powers. In 19 80 its trade with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe was roughly equivalent to its trade with
the United States. For West Germany trade questions were
interlaced with non-economic ones: reduced danger of
another Berlin crisis, repatriation of ethnic Germans
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and achieving a
better relationship with East Germany. [73]
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Japan, in return for providing equipment and creditsfo many projects in the Soviet Union, received long- mnver.es of raw materials. The Joint projects w
-ewe as a ,ea„ s of obtaining guaranteed access toSo let supplies of coal, timber, natural gas, etc. Such
relations were also hard to disrupt at one stroke.
Canada, Australia, and the European Communityincreased their grain exports to the Soviet Union too. Abig blow to the grain embargo was inflicted by the
fourfold increase of Argentinian grain exports. Theincentive for this was an attractive price, as much as
25* above the American selling price, paid by Soviet
purchasing agents. Price on grains in the Summer of 1980
increased in Argentina by 20-30* since the embargo. At
the same time, there were reports in the US Congress that
Argentina was buying grains in the USA which were cheaper
than Argentinian. [75] Between January and June 1980,
Argentina sold 3.75 mmt of grain to the Soviet Union and
in July 1 980 it concluded a five-year agreement to sell
the Soviets l|.5 mmt of grain annually. [76] In the end
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eased in 1980 in c°°p-*- „ ith 1979 . A11 t ;factors put an additional press
Administration to lift the sanctions.
There was a gradual change in the stance of some
-mbers of the Administration. The advocates of
Punishment" of the Soviet Union were becoming advocates
of the "business as usual" oolicv Tn h« qp -Ll y* J-n the Summer of 1980US officials were dropping hints of a future relaxation
of the grain embargo. [77] Despite previous rhetoric,
the outcome of the review of export licenses that were
suspended in January was unclear. [78] In November 1980
the Carter Administration approved export to the Soviet
Union of $79 million worth of big bulldozers to lay the
natural gas pipeline to Western Europe. Defense
Department officials objected to the sale on the ground
that it might make Western Europe more dependent on
Soviet energy supplies and more vulnerable to its
diplomatic pressures. [79]
In December 1980, Carter extended the grain embargo
and the other export controls for another year. [80]
However, one can doubt if he would have done so if he
remained in the White House for the second term. America
gradually returned to the "business as usual" policy.
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1980 was a presidential election year. Ronaldeagan, ca mpai g nin g against Carter> J
°"
esponse to the Soviet aggression. On February 15 l9Reagan said that Carter's fnr^o
"weakness ,nH m , oreign policy was based ona d illusion". it- -hrmi a k«
l ,
u s ould be replaced with onebased on military strength. [8„ summing up Reagan"!concrete proposal on the issue during tne
campaign one can single out tne following point.: Re
ould no blocc farm exports lf he were the PresidentHe would "funnel" weapons (Including missiles) throughPakistan to freedom fighters in Afghanistan, but he was
against direot American military aid to them. He wouldblockade Cuba in retaliation for the Soviet aggression ofAfghanistan. And as a general approach to the US-Soviet
relations he would significantly increase US military
spending. [82]
Having come to the White House, President Reagan
repeated his pledge to provide the Afghan rebels with
arms and called the grain embargo an unfair burden on US
farmers. However, "for foreign policy reasons" it was
kept in place until April 1981. [83]
Meanwhile, the pressure from the Congress and a part
of the Administration for lifting the sanctions was
increasing. In the Administration Secretary of
Agriculture John Block was an advocate of ending the
embargo promptly but others, notably Secretary of State
Haig, reportedly thought that the timing was not right
for it. On February 4, 1981, Reagan and the Cabinet
discussed the issue for half an hour without reaching a
decision. The Congress also was sharply divided. [84]
In March 19 81, Reagan mentioned increasing pressure from
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was that i/ reason fo-" ending the embargot was recognized as ineffective. [86]
The new American policy toward the USSR was narrowed
.
sharp increase of US military spending and a tighter
control on technological exports. The USA tried to denythe Soviet Union technology that would strengthen its
military might and to make Moscow divert resources awayfrom its military buildup. For that goal Washington
tried not to sell any technology that would allow theSoviets to leap ahead economically. [87] But even this
policy met a staunch resistance from American allies
which was clearly demonstrated later during the attempt
to deny Moscow Western technology for the natural gas
pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe.
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n gative feedback received on detentethere were more and more voices in the u .
nolirv tv, . West against thep cy The potential for further growth of economic
-operation was almost exhausted. As a response tSoviet military buildup Carter p!anned asubstant
crease of American defense spending. That is why ^Incalculat ng the consequences of the occupation offghamstan, Moscow apparently did not see what it couldlose a S a result of th< lntervenUon
_ Neverthele
Kremlin seemed to be surprised by the intensity of the
response from the USA and its allies. [88]
Confronted with the African actions the Soviets hadthree options: 1. According to the "sharpening conflict"
scenario Moscow could try to punish the Americans for the
sanctions by suspending cooperation in the areas which
were left untouched by Carter. They could declare an
embargo on fuels and raw materials shipments to the West
stop export of ammonia to the USA, sever economic
agreements untouched by the USA, suspend payments on the
Western credits pending "normalization of relations" and
blame the Americans for all this. At the same time
Moscow could launch a massive propaganda campaign in the
West to divide Western countries, isolate the US
Administration, and humiliate the USA by forcing it to
give up.
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° Pti ° n was to bide time, to liveroug the crisis without sharpening the conflict or aretreat. This was less dangerous than the first scenario
and eventually could bring the same benefits.
The fact that the Kremlin did not choose the firstoption points out a high degree of caution in Sovietforeign policy. The sharpening conflict policy coulddeteriorate East-West relations to an unrepairable degree
and cause an upsurge of conservatism in the USA which in
turn could bring about an unprecedented rate of military
spending. Such an adventurist policy has been rejected
by the Soviet leadership ever since Khrushchev's foreign
adventures. Brezhnev's generation of the Soviet elite
apparently preferred to avoid whenever possible all
extreme confrontations with the West.
This cautious Soviet foreign policy makes the
Kremlin prepared to pull back when resistance of an
adversary turns out to be stronger than anticipated.
When the opponent chooses to strike back, it is
surprisingly vulnerable and cooperative in joint efforts
to avoid a world war. [89]
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Economic cooperation with the West is viewed
necessary for modernization of Soviet economy but adisruption of the cooperation (especially a partial one
as in the case of the sanctions of 1980) could not cause
an economic collapse of the USSR. It could slow down
modernization, make it more costly, and jeopardize theprogram of improvement of the Soviet diet but all this
could not cause a crisis in the short run. And the
sanctions were not considered as a long-term policy.
A withdrawal of Russian forces was possible
approximately till the Summer of 1980. Later it could
cause a military hazard because by that time the Soviet
brutal, ruthless and indiscriminate campaign against both
the guerrillas and civilians had built up a legacy of
revenge among the Afghan population. Besides, the total
collapse of morale in the Afghan army made a phased
withdrawal and transfer of power to the Afghan forces
ss own
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impractical. [91] n nri_
adhered to the J circumstances, Moscowliving-through option alternating threatand peace initiatives in if propaganda.
In the first place, the Kremlin presented it,version of the events. According to ^ t
<
Afghanistan had teen a tabard feudal country un IApri revolution of 1978 directed it toward rogr shappiness. But Western imperialist n
allies in t y,
powers and their
the region did their utmost to returnAfghanistan to its feudal Da5tl a i p st, restore exploitation andregain domination of that country. [ 92]
The countries most involved in the subversive
activity against Afghanistan were the USA, Great Britain,China and Pakistan. They sent terrorists-mercenaries ofthe CIA to Afghanistan. [93] The uprisings of 1979 were
engineered and directed by the mercenaries of the CIAAt the same time the USA was preparing an overtintervention in Afghanistan. [ 9 K] On February 22 1980
Brezhnev said that there was already intervention in
Afghanistan from Pakistan. [95]
The president of Afghanistan in late 1979, Amin
also was a CIA agent (in other places, he just
collaborated with the CIA). [96] After he usurped power,
having killed the legitimate president of Afghanistan
Taraki in September 1979, Amin conducted an extremely
cruel policy. The CIA had a hand in the assassination of
Taraki. [97] On December 27, 1979, Amin was overthrown
by the Afghan people (not by the Soviet army). The
allegation that the USSR stood behind this event is a
lie. [98] Karmal became a new legitimate leader of the
Afghanistan. [ 99J
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"numerous appeals of th PAfghan leaders" to intervene ((version of the SovietForeign Minister Gromyko ). t10l] Such
ooul be granted in compl iance uith t„.
Treaty of Friendship of December 5
, 1 9T8
, ArtioleArticle 51 of the UN Charter which erantlri
the ri„v,t * . g nted any countrym gh to provide militarv airf („ -,y d to a member state thatappealed for such a help. [102]
In order to save the April revolution and to helpthe Afghan people, the USSR sent its troops to the
country. This was justified because the United States
Pakistan, and China were covertly supporting Islamicinsurrection there and because the imperialistintervention in Afghanistan created the possibility of
faking it an imperialist military bridgehead on the
Soviet southern border. [103]
There are a number of discrepancies in the Soviet
version. There was no American military intervention in
Afghanistan prior to the Soviet intervention. But there
was apparently a covert CIA activity as well as the KGB
one. The pr opaga ndi stic trick with the word
"intervention" makes a covert activity and a military
intervention equal. Since there are Soviet secret agents
in the USA and American secret agents in the USSR one can
(using the Soviet terminology) that there ls Sov ,intervention in the USA and vice versa.
To justify the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan thKremlin referred to the 1978 Treatv of
S e
the Treaty mentioned a pos bi \ Z ^intervention only in a athp milit^y
both sides nmi v T ; agUeUay -
consensus ti , " T!" 0"ake appropriate measures to Drnv-M.security, independence, and territorial
both countries » [104 th „[ Vl ° riS sovereignty of
reouired . \ UtUal conse"^" definitelyq an invitation of the Soviet troops ty the Afghaovernment. Amin did not invite them. At least,
re no reports on that. Besides, why should he invitSoviet troops if he was a CIA agent? So, it could havebeen done only by Karmal. Amin was overthrown and Killed
on December 27, 1979 . Thls was announced fcy^
made no public appearance in Kabul and whose address wasbroadcast by Tashkent Radio in the Soviet Union. All
subsequent Afghan government statements were also issued
by the Soviet news media. [105] According to the Soviet
sources, Karmal became General Secretary of the People's
Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Chairman of the
Revolutionary Council, and Prime Minister only on
December 28, 1979, and only on that day the Afghan
government called on the USSR for help. [106] But the
Soviet troops started the invasion on December 27, i.e.
before the invitation. [107] The invasion was thoroughly
prepared. The preparation also took place before the
invitation. All this indicates that the Soviet
explanation was a rather heavy-handed fabrication.
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" "» a^< to the originaltext he two texts of the appeal are different. In thers on broadcast by Kabul radio on December 28 the wordincluding military aid" are followed by "for which thegovernment of DRA has asked many times before." [109] Inthe published version the latter phrase is absent. [, 10 ]The correction was probably made because "before" there
was the government of Amin.
The Soviet media praises two faithful
"comrades-revolutionaries", Taraki and Karmal. But in
September 1978 when Taraki was Prime Minister, General
secretary of the ruling party, and Chairman of the
Revolutionary Council, elements of Karmal
-s faction in
the party were purged from the government in the wake of
an alleged coup attempt. Karmal was ordered to return to
Kabul from Czechoslovakia, where he was Afghanistan's
Ambassador, to stand trial as a plotter, but he refused
and remained in Czechoslovakia. [111]
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nounced the Soviets deciared wouid
would bring mere harm to the USA than to the USSR. Thearguments later used in the USA that trade is beneficialto both sides, that it gives jobs in the West, etc. wer epresented lavishly. Brezhnev insisted that the SovietUnion could do fine without the connections with the USA
"I can guarantee that our plans to provide Soviet people
with bread will not be cut down even by a kilogram"
[111] Meanwhile, an editorial in "Pravda" admitted that
procurement plans for meat, fowl, and milk were not
fulfilled. [115]
In the spring of 1980, the USSR, trying to achieve a
lifting of the grain embargo, began to publish false data
about expected good crops in the Soviet Union. The April
1. 1 980
,
ItLfi HfiK lurk Times wrote: "Soviet press says
that initial reports from the field point to a good
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harvest in the fall [ 0 f iQfinl i»loi gaoj, large enough to avert anverioo decllneinmeatproductionbecauseof
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of feed gral ns. Despite unfavorable weather during t e
1 : r hing has happened as yet to~ Vsfro. gathering the planned harvest", sald an article 1the Engl 1Sh-lan6 uage weekly UsLSssm U^. I n aoagricultural specialists are looking to a bunper 1980harvest, one that could lead to *nUiU 0 a increase m the output
of meat and dairy production." This was puredisinformation.
„.
^ thG f811 the world darned about anotherdisastrous Soviet harvest. The previous statements about
the harvest were a lie aimed at influencing American
public opinion. That public opinion came to the
conclusion that the grain embargo failed to affect Soviet
agriculture, and therefore it was a blunder. The news
about "bumper 1980 harvest in the USSR" contributed
greatly to raising demands to lift the embargo.
The Soviet economy failed to help Soviet propaganda.
The 1980 harvest was far from "a bumper one". But still
Soviet leaders claimed a victory, trying to discourage
even further the use of economic sanctions. In August
1980 Brezhnev said that the US policy had failed because
the goods barred for export by the American government
were bought by the Soviet Union in other countries and it
was American farmers and businessmen who lost. [116]
The second principle of the Soviet propaganda can be
formulated as "discourage your adversary from any
resistance; present arguments against the adversary's
moves; use even false information to discourage him". In
its propaganda the Kremlin used threats anHinitiatives simultaneously The
-eats was Western puhl^pin 'J^T *™
"
countries can afreet national leadership! m*""'"
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There were economic threats «],» Uk„
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the Sov e Union, the Soviets suggested that they couldsuspend payments on the $180 million credit that they hadborrowed from the Export-Import Ban k to finance theammoni a plants. [ 1 1 9]
But mostly Moscow tried to intimidate Western public
opinion by threats that US policy was leading the world
to a nuclear war. There was nothing special about
Afghanistan, it was said, but the real reason for the
commotion was that Washington did not want detente and
Afghanistan was only a pretext to bury it. [120] In
February 1980, the Soviet Union resumed military
maneuvers in Cuba and in March it announced that if the
United States does not ratify SALT II then the Soviet
Union would not adhere to its provisions (the USA had
announced before that it would not ratify the Treaty but
would adhere to it). [121]
Blaming Washington as a warmonger and threatening
militarily and economically, Moscow at the same time
presented itself as a peace loving country which stood
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Anther, it would not Interfere in theinternal affairs of Iran or any other country. [122
"
peace^iMtVT ^ laUnched * ofeace initiatives. While in Washington
.ore and
.oreoices spoke out against detente and cooperation withRussians (which frightened ma ny people in Wester
countries,, Moscow declared that it still stood
" "
Peace, detente, and cooperation with the West. It
announced that it would withdraw its forces f roraAfghanistan as soon as
-there is no necessity of theirpresence in the country". [123]
New peace initiatives were made at the meeting ofthe Politcommittee of Warsaw Bloc countries in May 1 9 80in Warsaw. They included proposals to stop the arms race
and to strengthen peace. In addition, Brezhnev met with
d'Estaing in Warsaw. It was the first summit with a
Western leader after the occupation of Afghanistan.
[124] Meanwhile, "the government of Afghanistan" made a
peace proposal to settle the Afghan issue which included
the end of military intervention in Afghanistan from
abroad. This was a purely propaga ndi s tic maneuver as in
the West this point could be (and was) understood as
directed against the Soviet military presence. But later
it turned out that "the government of Afghanistan" meant
the cessation of military intervention in Afghanistan
from the territories of Pakistan and Iran. That is why
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the world accepts Afghanistan as a Soviet satellite, theSoviet Union could withdraw its troops (after the order
13 restored in the country) but could occupy Afghanistan
again if need be under a pretext of foreign intervention
into internal affairs of the country from abroad. When
the United States and Western Europe promised to
guarantee that Afghanistan would be neutral in case of
Soviet withdrawal, Moscow did not respond. [127] This
again draws a line between the positions of the two
sides: the USSR wanted Afghanistan as a Soviet satellite
while the West wanted it neutral. Later, in February
1981, at the 26th Party congress Brezhnev clarified
further the Soviet position on Afghanistan. He proposed
a dialog with the USA, an international agreement on the
Persian Gulf area, and other peace initiatives but
emphasized that only international aspects of the Afghan
on
mew
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The Kremlin suggested making an agreementinterae iate range nuclear weapons in Europe and made
roposals on mutual reduction of forces in CentralEurope. All this was partlcularly lmportant fof We£tGermany and other European nations. Shmidt said at the
meeting that being in the center of Europe, Germans could
ose everything in a new war and they realised this
[129] Both sides considered detente a necessary policy
They agreed to follow old agreements, to continue
economic and scientific cooperation, and signed a newlong-term program of cooperation. However, an agreement
on new Soviet proposals on military issues was possible
only if the USA ratified SALT II. [130] So, this turned
out to be only an artfully elaborated lure of Soviet
propaganda. The Soviet goals were to get a summit with a
Western European leader, to reassure continuation of
economic cooperation when the USA asked to curtail it,
and, thus, to increase antagonism between Europeans and
Americans. All these goals were achieved. In August
Moscow made proposals to Japan too but it did not work
out as well as with Shmidt. [131]
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In September 1980, the USSR stepped out with anotherPeace initiative. It brought to the U N the
urgent measures to reduce military th eaf Theproposal contained a refusal r
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relying heavily on law an agreements the participation in
a bloc is a necessary condition. A proposition by a
non-democratic regime to refuse to increase militaryforces without control also makes no sense and can be
regarded as a propaganda maneuver.
The aim of all the peace initiatives was to calmpublic opinion in the West and to distract its attentionfrom Afghanistan. The abundance of peace initiatives
launched by the Kremlin after the invasion allows us to
single out another principle of Soviet foreign
propaganda: "after a military intervention talk about
peace more than anyone else".
At the same time Moscow did its utmost to shift
attention of world public opinion from Afghanistan to
other events. Manipulating world public opinion by
drawing its attention to certain events and making other
ones forgotten is an important task of Soviet foreign
propaganda. In this art the Soviets hardly have their
match. Western scholars repeatedly ask the question:
how can they do it? Why did public opinion not forget
about the Vietnam war while it calls the Afghanistan war
"a forgotten war"? Why did the public opinion forget
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to Japan: «»•»•»•».» «* L L i0gainst Soviet refusal even to disouss the transfer
of the Kurile Islands". [133 ] Why are the
-ration, against violations of human right
2 Afrioa and almost none against violations I LZiBhts ln the Soviet Union? Is the Soviet Union moredemocrats than South Afrioa? One oan find scores ofsuch examples.
Trying to answer this question one comes across anresting phenomenon. The more dictatorial a regime
e easier it can suppress any resistance or protests
the country, the easier it can keep domestic and
ign media away from the events. So, if country A is
emocratic but also not dictatorial enough to prevent
otests in the country, the protests will burst out
'ill be reported in the world as a sensation. If
B is dictatorial to such a degree that it can
t any protest in the country or keep reporters away
ts negative aspects, there will be no reports on
pression in it.
he result is paradoxical: for world public opinion
*ore dictatorial country will look better (since
are no protests). People will see on TV
nations in Chile and South Africa (and brutal
e to them on the part of the police) but they will
demonstrations in the Soviet Union (and there are
almost no demonstrations or reporters are kept
~om some which still occur). A common man just
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sti„ g to Western media certain sensations anTmakiother events non-sensational or of a nothing-new kindthe Kremlin shifts attention from one event to another.
In our ease Soviet propaganda did all possible to
make the intervention in Afghanistan a nothing-new type
event. The Soviet army had to help in this undertaking
to the Soviet propaganda maohine sine the important thinghere is a monopoly on information and for that Western
reporters had to be kept away from the battle zones in
Afghanistan. Only utterly courageous newsmen tried to
get to the zones. But courageous men are rare in the
world and it is possible and much safer and no less
sensational to report on an Israeli raid on an Arab
village than a Soviet raid on an Afghan one.
Having achieved a monopoly on information, the
Soviets tried to persuade the world that there was
nothing sensational in Afghanistan, that the Afghan army
totally controlled the situation in the country, that
life there was in a normal condition, the
counterrevolutionaries were defeated, etc. [1311] This
routine-kind coverage of the events distracted attention
from Afghanistan. Soon the Soviet war became a forgotten
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;- -i-t the Soviet Union than to the „itself The Western media did not want to write onAfghanistan since nothing-new reports were not sellable
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^ time
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Wh6n AmeriCa
" government tried
° ract attention to the war it was bla med forterference ntc the interna! affairs of the country andor trying to revive the spirit of the Cold war. 135](But when the Soviet Union attracted attention to theVietnam war nobody blamed the Kremlin for reviving the
spirit of the Cold war). When the cuestion of the eventsin Afghanistan was brought up in the UN the "government
of Afghanistan" vigorously protested against thediscussion because it was an interference into the
country's internal affairs. [136]
On the other hand, world attention was shifted to
other events, existing and imaginary: the hostage crisis
in Iran, American preparations to attack Iran, a
sensational American failure of the helicopter rescue of
the hostages in Iran in the spring of 1980. [137] The
Soviet Union launched an angry propaganda campaign
against a possibility of supplying Afghan rebels with
weapons by the United States. [138] And, of course, the
attention was drawn to the economic sanctions and
deliberations and their negative effects on the US
economy. Thus, another principle of Soviet foreign
propaganda is "try to shift world attention away from the
events detrimental to Soviet prestige to the events
detrimental to an adversary's prestige."
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"livin*through the crisis" ea «Ho,. r . , g 8
supposed to redu to a
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ZZ t , " 1981 ' ^ S °Viet -P-sentatives
wi / ' talkE t0 arrange eXtra «•*»thin hours after 1 i fting the emba rgo ) . [140] Thus,the sharpening conflict" option was rejected by theSoviet leaders.
Meanwhile, the Soviets tried to do their utmost to
reduce economic dependency on the West. In August 19 80
Brezhnev brought up the idea of the Food program till
1990 which was clearly aimed at reducing the Soviet
dependency to a minimum. [141] The Politburo accepted
the idea and decided to work out the program as a part of
the 11th FYP (1981-1985). Brezhnev called upon members
of the Central Committee to continue large investments in
agriculture, to increase labor discipline, to grant more
managerial freedom to local authorities, to increase the
standard of living in agricultural areas in order to
attract labor. [142] The 26th Party congress adopted the
Food program in February 1981. It was emphasized that
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the major difficulty was a lack of fodder grains (aSov.e
.mport item) and a need to increase
nnual grain production was expressed (up to 238-243 mmtof gram a year). [143] Tne progpam ^ fulproblem which caused new Soviet record
imports from the West.
fericuitural
Another practical step was to diversify Soviet food
-Ports. the USSR concluded long-term food agreements
with Argentina (July 1980), Canada (May 1 9 81), and Brazil(July 1981). [11|4]
Trying to assess the political effect of the
sanctions one can consider not only what the Kremlin did
but also what it did not do. Its general pattern of
international behavior is "push for more gains as long as
an adversary is pulling back". But having met decisive
resistance it demonstrates great caution and tries to
avoid a dangerous confrontation by all possible means.
In our case one can assume that if the Carter response
had been weaker than it was, the Soviets would have
intervened more actively into events in Poland. There
had been a number of precedents for such actions before
(Czechoslovakia in 1968, etc.) as well as the Brezhnev
doctrine. On the contrary now, trying to avoid a direct
involvement in Poland, Moscow lost precious time and had
to allow the Polish crisis to go rather far, a result
which had a significant negative impact on Soviet
prestige and the world communist movement. The fact that
the Soviets did not intervene directly in Poland at the
time of a crisis might be considered as a political
effect of the US reaction to the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan because usually and according to the Brezhnev
1 7 A
doctrine the Soviets intervene decisively intc events ofa socialist country whe re socialise ls ln Jeo ^Their cautious approach toward the Polish oris cexplained b y willl n 6ness to calm down the
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reaction to it on the part of the United States.
In its domestic policy the Soviet reaction to the
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to inc- a" p»i"ic.icontrol, consolidate even
.ore. This reaction is c„„„ n
hand h •
" ° riSiS SitUati
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V 6 W6Stern radl ° br0ad-^ they restrictedeven that minimal information which the Soviet people gotfrom abroad before. They enhanced repressions againstdissidents. It was at this time that Sakharov was sentinto internal exile in Gorky. [n, 5] The emigration from
the Soviet Union was curtailed drastically. On the other
hand, having restricted foreign information, Moscow
increased anti-Western propaganda inside the country
The Soviet media was flooded with "demonstrations of the
unity of the Party and people". [1H6]
The analysis of the Soviet reaction to the economic
sanctions helps to outline a pattern of Soviet behavior
in a crisis situation. In such a situation the Kremlin
relies heavily on foreign propaganda. This plays a much
greater role for the USSR than for the United States.
The analysis here supports the hypothesis that in its
propaganda Moscow tries to demoralize the adversary and
to soften his resistance by an alternation of severe
pressure and holding out the prospect of compromise.
[117] The Soviets widely use division between Western
allies. They are more tenacious than Western democracies
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in holding gams which they have acquired At thetime they are verv ea „Hni , same
avoid 1 " tlOUS co^rative in trying toa dangerous confrontation. Thev «r« i
on tne 's ^ "'"^ ^ ° f the """on.h Soviet economy because W e have insufficientinformation on the economic situation in the U
v et statistics are hardly relive, especially in aoris is situation when they also play a propaganda role.On the other hand, Soviet foreign trade statistics can be
verified by publications of other countries and therefor
cannot be falsified. What we can do is to point outthose branches of the Soviet economy which could be
affected mostly by sanctions and use indirect information
to estimate approximately to what degree the sanctions
were effective. One also should remember that the
sanctions were not intended to starve Soviet people or
cause economic collapse of the USSR
.
In 1979, before the sanctions were imposed, American
share of Soviet foreign trade was very low: only 3.5%.
In 1980 it fell to 1.6*. On the other hand, the
percentage of Soviet grain imports from the USA in total
Soviet grain imports was rather high, more than 50%. In
October 1979 Moscow made plans to import 35 mmt of grain
in the next 12 months and about 25 mmt were to be
supplied by the United States. [148] In the end of 1979
- first days of 1980 the Kremlin significantly speeded up
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^0, the embargo could affect themeat production and the livestock in the USS nPrevious years with poor harvests the Soviets usuallyslaughtered their livestock, which had a profo
negative impact on consecutive years. This happened, forexample, after the disastrous 1975 harvest. m 1980Moscow did all it could to avoid another slaughter. Thelatter could be dangerous politically and socially
causing more discontent among the Soviet population!
Instead, the Soviets drew down grain stocks - by an
estimated 17 mmt, and relied heavily on agricultural
Sports. [150] The situation was more than unpleasant
for the Soviet leaders. The widespread food shortages
caused a number of strikes in 1980. The biggest, in May,
at the Togliatti motor works on the Volga River and at
the Gorky auto and truck plant, were prompted by
prolonged shortages of meat and diary products in the
entire Volga region. [151] The strikes were not large
but in the repressive Soviet regime they are an
outstanding fact. We certainly do not have sufficient
information on the true degree of popular discontent in
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rrespon ents noticed that tempers of Russian consumweg rowi ng shorter as food lines greW longer. OnOctober 21, 198 0, Brezhnev admitted that Soviet
agricu ture was in great trouble. Meat production was 5%less than in 1979, butter output was down H%
f and thepotato and sugar beet crops lagged. [ 153 ] Per capita
meat and fat consumption fell in 1 9 80. Milk and egg
production fell down too. The economic plan for 1980 was
mot fulfilled. [154] All this with a growing population.
It is hard to say whether the shortfalls were a
consequence of the embargo or the result of poor weather
conditions and systemic problems in Soviet agriculture.
The Soviets were able to replace most of the embargoed
grain from other sources. But in any event, the timing
for the grain embargo was propitious. The cost of
importing grain from other sources was higher. The DIA
estimated that the Soviet Union had to pay additional $1
billion for grain imports because of the embargo. [155]
The Soviet agricultural problems deepened. In 1 9 8 1 the
26th Party congress decided to increase the private
sector in Soviet agriculture (so called peasants' plots,
cattle, etc.). The grain embargo seems to have
contributed to this decision. This confirms the thesis
178
that pressure rather than detente and well beln .cause reforms in the Soviet Uni
'"8 can
on.
....
™:
b
",::,'
l
,r
,
:;,r
p
:;:;
*° ?;r - -
.-r. «... ...» .,„„„ ,:;:«,„ * ; tembargoed superphosphatic acid with
P-sphate roc k fr0m Morocco a Me ^ '*
rook ic " xico. Importing thec s less convenient since it rM ni, oe
„ ^ • . .
xi equ res more proce^inaand is highly corrosive. [1 56 ]
P essi g
From the outset there was „ih
that fh. mu .
3 3 Wlde spread perceptiont e high technology restrictions could not have area impact on the Soviet economy if the United St te
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— ° f ^ —ionswas at it caused the Soviets to delay certainindustrial projects and to spend more money as they triedto step up business with Western Europe and Japan. They
a so introduced serious uncertainties into the SovietPlanning process at a time when the next FYP was in thefinal stages of elaboration. [157]
The Olympic boycott undoubtedly cost Moscow millions
of dollars in lost revenues. [158] By and large
however, the effect of the sanctions on Soviet economy
was not great. The major reasons for this were a high
degree of self-sufficiency of the USSR, a small share of
the USA in total Soviet trade, the fact that Moscow could
purchase banned goods from other sources, and that the
sanctions were short lived. A number of Western sources
emphasized that the impact of the sanctions could be
greater in the long run. [159]
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f 3 ^ lo» ^arSov t nion in US foreign trade. During thearter presidency this share was about 1 % of\ 0An rican export while the US export to Canada was 2and to Japan - 10-15% [1601 Th„ «io*. L 1 0 J e American agricultural
exports to the Soviet Union was greater but alinsignificant: about 5 , of total agricultural export.The exports of grain (the main item of US export to theUSSR) totaled about 10%. [ 161] However, the grain
embargo did not cover all US grain exports to the SovietUnion but only 68% of them. So, the sanctions could have
a limited effect on American agricultural producers and a
number of Soviet-oriented fir.s but not on the American
economy in general.
After the imposition of the grain embargo the
condition of the farm sector of American economy
continued to worsen. At that time grain grower, farm
groups, and some members of Congress tended to attribute
all or most of the farm sector's economic difficulties to
the embargo. [162] This seems to be inaccurate and
dictated by political rather than economic reasons.
In the first place, the share of the banned
agricultural (including grain) exports was too small to
affect the farmers seriously. Second, even before the
embargo, farm income in 1 980 was forecast to be 20% less
than in 1979, due to steep increases in the cost of
inputs (rising costs of fuels, fertilizers, and credit)
and the record 1979 crop. [1631 If it was really the
embargo which caused the worsening farmers' situation,
then why did it not improve after the embargo was lifted
s ome
on
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In order to limit the impact of the grain embargoAfrican farmers and grain exporters, the US governmenttook a number of steps. On January 7 1 QRn t
""""^
that it ,j ..
-Janua 7, 1 980, it announced
it would buy the contracts for grain that had been
earmarked for the Soviet Union before the embargo „1-PO.e (13.7 mmt). The contracts were estimate to bor h$ 25blllion
. £165] The government ^
*
to buy the grain that dockworkers had refused to load forthe Soviet Union. The Agriculture Secretary said thatthe Administration had stepped in to buy the unshipped
Soviet grain to prevent its "having to be dumped on the
market at disastrous prices". The Carter Administration
also promised not to resell the grain below the January
1, 1980, prices. [166]
There were other measures aimed at alleviation of
the farmers' situation: changes in regulations of the
farmer-owned grain reserve to provide incentives for
farmers who had not yet arranged for the sale of their
grain to place it on reserve; purchases by the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC) of up to 4 mmt of wheat for the
foreign food assistance program; a pledge to institute a
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corn Prices werehigher t an they had teen prior to the embargo.October 1980, prices for corn and soybeans were above tpre-embargo levels. [169]
The embargo was expected to reduce the US balance oftrade surplus in agricultural commodities. Instead, the
embargo had the effect of rearranging the internationalgram trade. other countries, notably Argentina,
increased grain sales to the Soviet Union at the expense
of traditional customers, who turned to the USA for
supplies. At that time the Carter Administration signed
erain agreements with Mexico (7.2 mmt a year) and China(6mmtayear). t 170] In 1 980, the demand for grains in
the world increased. That is why, despite the embargo,
US agricultural (including grain) exports increased too.
[171] The increased demand for grains in other countries
was brought about not only by bad harvests in the world
but also by the fact that the USSR bought grains at high
prices in the countries which had not been its suppliers
before
.
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The technological ban could produce even
of the ban on the transfer of technology. Notably
, ^ban on export of spare computer parts and the ngineassembly U„e for the KamAZ affected IBM andngerson-Hand. Both companies described the impa ctthe corporations as "minimal" nvoi •1
* L172J The impact of thephosphate ban fell mainiv rt „ nc
but „o ,
*
31 ly
° n US P^ducers of phosphatesUS farmers benefited. The USA had to sell phosphatesto other countries, this caused a price decline and,hence, losses for domestic producers. Occidental was thebiggest loser. [1 73 ] The Olympic boycott affected a
number of American firms, including travel agencies, but
the export ban on goods related to the Olympics had a
very little impact on the USA. [174]
The curtail of US exports to the USSR had another
negative economic impact: it increased the deficit of
the US trade balance. American exports to the Soviet
Union in T 9 80 were expected to reach $4.8 billion but it
dropped to $1.5 billion. [175] So, more than $3 billion
was added to the deficit because of the sanctions.
However, it is hard to assess how much was really lost
because the sanctions caused not a reduction of the US
exports but shifted some of them to other countries
(especially agricultural and phosphate exports).
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CONCLUSION.
The analysis of US-Soviet relations in the late
1970s
- early 1 980s allows one to draw a number of
conclusions on and compare major principles of Soviet and
American foreign policy, US and Soviet patterns of
behavior in a crisis situation, and US ability to affect
Soviet policy.
Soviet foreign policy is more coherent, consecutive,
and stable than the American one. This seems to be a
result of different political systems. If the US policy
is more an outcome of political controversy between
numerous groups and individuals in the Administration,
the Congress, and bureaucracy, then the Soviet foreign
policy is more that of a rational actor. The
consecutiveness of Soviet policy and at the same time
sharp changes of general course after a new leader comes
to power corroborates this conclusion. Different
interest groups do play a role in Soviet foreign policy
but much less than in American.
There are two main parts to Soviet foreign policy:
actions and propaganda. In its propaganda the Kremlin is
offensive and ideological in the sense of justifying
means for future goals. But in its actions Moscow is
very pragmatic and cautious. It usually tries to avoid
risky actions such as the Afghan intervention. Moscow
uses such actions as a last resort. Normally it prefers
to act through proxies and clandestine operations rather
than overtly. The events surrounding the Polish crisis
at the time also demonstrate that Soviet leaders try to
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avoid direct intervention.
The gap between propaganda and actions in Soviet
foreign policy is more conspicuous when the Kremlin finds
itself in a crisis situation. Usually Soviet response
then 18 a hard
'
aggressive propaganda campaign
accompanied by more cautious actions. The Soviets are
very concerned about their prestige domestically and in
the world. But they try to maintain the prestige in
terms of power rather than morality. The Kremlin seems
to be almost indifferent to moral prestige. Its major
principle can be formulated as "Let them hate us but
respect our power". However, when prestige of power is
concerned the USSR is extremely tenacious.
In practice this means that the West can gain
concessions from the Soviets only behind the scenes in
face-saving wrappings. When confronted with overt
pressure the Soviets become extremely cautious but at the
same time tenacious. They do not give up when "power
prestige" is concerned.
When the Kremlin finds itself in a crisis situation
and has to resort to an extreme action like the
intervention in Afghanistan it demonstrates thorough and
cautious preparation. All steps and timing are carefully
calculated in advance. There is no improvisation or
spontaneous move on the Soviet side. In the case of
Afghanistan and other examples when the Soviet Union used
its military forces directly one can outline a general
pattern: the forces are used massively, swiftly, and
with determination. This differs from the pattern of
behavior of the USA which usually uses its forces
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Piecemeal, sporadically, and in escalation. On thecontrary, the Passive and concentrated use of US forcein Grenada was in the Soviet manner (and successful).
The general pattern of Soviet foreign p 0l icy ls
characterized by constant offensive pressure on Western
countries. The Kremlin looks for every "weak at-testing the West with new actions and demands andincreases its pressure on a specific country at an
appropriate moment.
But at the same time Moscow always knows where to
stop. When Western tolerance runs out and the adversary
responds in a harsh manner (like the US sanctions of
January 1980) Moscow stops the offensive and becomes very
cautious and cooperative in actions (though still
offensive and insulting in propaganda). m this
situation the Soviets do not try to sharpen the conflict
but to bide time until the West gets used to the new
Soviet gain. After the gain becomes accepted de facto
Moscow resumes pressure on the adversary looking for new
opportuni ties
.
The actions leading to a new conflict (the
initiatives) usually come from the Soviet side while the
USA is usually on the defensive trying to preserve the
status quo. This gives the Kremlin a significant
advantage by allowing it to choose the time and place of
its next strike. This is accompanied with intense Soviet
propaganda campaigns alternating threats with peace
initiatives. Thus the pattern of a conflict is: a
Soviet action (massive and swift, well prepared, at a
"weak link")
- Western reaction (usually improvisation) -
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Soviet reaction to the Western reaction (extremelytious n deeds but offensiye in words) _
.11
accommodation
- a new Soviet action, and so on.
USSR
the ° ry
°
f Chan6in6 P3ttern by *"in g the
economic rewards for prolonged periods of
accomodation and by withdrawing the rewards in case of anew Soviet action turned out to be wrong. The SovietPolicy during detente and widening economic cooperation
with the West has demonstrated that even in such
conditions the Soviet leaders did not abandon massive
military build-up and generally offensive pressure on the
West. They never abandoned the ultimate goal of worlddominance wrapped in ideological justifications.
The American ability to affect Soviet behavior by
export controls appears to be very limited. The economic
effect of the sanctions on both countries was
insignificant because of a very low level of mutual
dependency. I n such an attempt the USA was not backed up
by its allies for a long time and short-term sanctions
could be successful only if undertaken together with the
allies. That is why the. Soviet Union did not make
concessions. Politically the sanctions hurt the United
States more than the Soviet Union (relations with the
allies, controversy in the USA, etc.).
Tying the Soviet Union to the West turned into tying
a number of Western business groups to the Soviet Union
and made a disruption of the ties politically difficult.
Now the economic cooperation which originally was
considered as a reward given for good Soviet behavior is
called "business as usual", and in view of the
201
impossibility of changing Soviet behavior is being g ive nno matter what the Kremlin does. Sharp changes andinconsistency in US foreign trade policy prod UC ed
negative economic and political effects.
The Soviet aggression in Afghanistan was apparently
unexpected for the Carter Administration. There was no
contingency plan for this case. The measures were taken
with delay in favor of the Soviet Union (the best example
was export of phosphates). If another American
Administration tries to use trade for political purposes
(though it is unlikely after the 1 980-1 981 experience) it
should prepare in advance a plan of fast imposition of
sanctions in response to certain Soviet actions. It also
can try to use bargaining before an export license is
issued (a license in exchange for a political concession)
rather than by implicit threat of withdrawal of the
economic reward. However, in any case economic sanctions
cannot be effective enough to change Soviet policy. The
sanctions cannot be long-term as public opinion has a
tendency to calm down in a while if it is not stirred up
by a new Soviet action. And Soviet policy after a sharp
Western response becomes extremely cautious in order to
avoid such new actions. The Kremlin takes new steps only
after world public opinion has accepted a Soviet gain as
a part of a new status quo.
The Kremlin does everything possible to achieve
detente in economic-technological matters. It tries to
persuade Western public opinion that economic cooperation
should develop independently from political-military
actions. It also promotes long-term East-West economic
projects which make sanctions more and more difficult.
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The Western ability to change Soviet domestic policyby using economic pressure is extremely limited too.Usual Soviet response to external pressure is to tighten
up domestically rather than to try reforms. Reforms candraw the country into an unravelling process which could
be too dangerous politically for the Soviet elite
Reforms in the USSR can come about as a result of a
domestic crisis rather than pressure from abroad. But
economic cooperation with the Soviets only helps to avoid
or put off such a crisis.
The Soviet Union is not vulnerable in the sense that
it is almost self-sufficient economically and can survive
without Western help. Western economic sanctions can
have a negative but still an insignificant effect on its
economy. The West cannot think about the USSR in terms
of an imminent collapse. Therefore economic sanctions
aimed at "improvement" of Soviet behavior are likely to
fail
.
On the other hand, the USSR is vulnerable in the
sense that Western help is directed to key sectors of the
Soviet economy which can improve the situation in other
sectors. For example, technological innovations in and
development of the chemical industry help the Russians to
improve their agriculture by providing them with an
ability to make their own fertilizers. The Soviets are
vulnerable in the sense that the speed, cost, and
technological level of their modernization depend on an
influx of Western technology and capital.
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Noisy political campaigns connected to Soviet
actions (as that which accompanied the grain embargo) arebetter avoided as failure to change Soviet policy can
damage American prestige in the world and prove to the
Soviet common people that "Americans are against us" and
thus push them to a nationalistic support of the
communist authorities.
An important objective of US foreign policy is to
maintain stability in the world. An economic collapse of
the Soviet Union might become a too dangerous event of a
destabilizing nature. Therefore economic warfare against
the USSR aimed at causing its economic collapse should
not be a goal of the US economic sanctions. The goal can
better be a gradual weakening of the Soviet Union's
ability to be a destabilizing factor in international
relations.
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